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Longstanding judicial precedent and the official position of the IRS 
agree that federal tax refund suits are limited only by the two-year 
statute of limitations of § 6532(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code, 
which is triggered only when the IRS mails the claimant a notice of 
disallowance.  This Article contends that tax refund litigation is also 
governed by the six-year limitation of 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) on “every 
civil action commenced against the United States,” which is triggered 
upon the accrual of a claim.  The Supreme Court alluded to this dual-
limitation scheme in 2008 in United States v. Clintwood Elkhorn 
Mining Co., stating in dicta that the six-year bar places an “outside 
limit” on the tax-specific limitation. 
Applying the six-year bar as a backstop to tax refund suits would 
enforce its plain meaning, would accord with multiple canons of 
statutory construction, would promote timely resolution of tax refund 
claims, and would bring tax refund litigation into line with the rest of 
federal claims jurisprudence, thereby eliminating one manifestation 
of the tax exceptionalism that the Supreme Court criticized last term 
in Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. United 
States. 
Even while abandoning its tax-exceptional doctrine, the IRS may 
be able to soften the blow to potential claimants’ reliance interests by 
systematically granting extensions of the limitation period pursuant to 
§ 6532(a)(2).  This would buy time for attentive taxpayers to file suit 
while putting future claimants on notice that they must pursue their 
claims in court within six years of accrual. 
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INTRODUCTION 
he world of federal tax law has long been plagued by “tax 
exceptionalism,”1 the notion that “tax law is somehow different 
from other areas of the law” and plays by different rules.2  The 
Supreme Court may have sounded the death knell for such “tax 
myopia” this year in Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & 
Research v. United States, when it unanimously declined “to carve 
out an approach to administrative review good for tax law only.”3  
Instead the Court emphasized “the importance of maintaining a 
uniform approach to judicial review of administrative action”4 and 
held that Treasury regulations are subject to Chevron deference rather 
than a tax-specific standard.5  Although this passage in Mayo was 
particularly concerned with curing just one of tax myopia’s most 
acute symptoms—idiosyncratic standards of judicial deference to 
agency action—it signaled a broader policy of harmonizing tax law 
with the rest of administrative law.6  One symptom of tax 
exceptionalism that stands in the way of that project is the notion that 
tax refund suits are exempt from the time limit that applies to every 
other kind of suit against the government. 
According to 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a), “every civil action commenced 
against the United States shall be barred unless the complaint is filed 
within six years after the right of action first accrues.”7  A companion 
 
1 Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial 
Deference, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1537, 1541 (2006) (“The view that tax is different or special 
creates, among other problems, a cloistering effect that too often leads practitioners, 
scholars, and courts considering tax issues to misconstrue or disregard otherwise 
interesting and relevant developments in non-tax areas, even when the questions involved 
are not particularly unique to tax.”). 
2 Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia, or Mamas Don’t Let Your Babies Grow up to Be Tax 
Lawyers, 13 VA. TAX REV. 517, 519 (1994) (discussing tax-specific theories of the role of 
legislative history in statutory construction and deference to administrative guidance, inter 
alia, and calling for a “symbiotic relationship between tax and nontax law”). 
3 131 S. Ct. 704, 713 (2011). 
4 Id. (quoting Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 154 (1999)). 
5 Id. (“The principles underlying our decision in Chevron apply with full force in the tax 
context. . . .  We see no reason why our review of tax regulations should not be guided by 
agency expertise pursuant to Chevron to the same extent as our review of other 
regulations.” (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 
(1984))). 
6 See Kristin Hickman, Goodbye National Muffler! Hello Administrative Law, 
TAXPROF BLOG (Jan. 11, 2011), http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2011/01 
/hickman-.html (noting a general “orientation toward equating the tax and non-tax 
contexts”). 
7 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a).  
T
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statute imposes the same limitation period on claims brought in the 
Court of Federal Claims.8  Despite the plain meaning of this statute of 
limitations, federal courts and the Treasury Department have for the 
past half century read into it an unwritten exception for tax refund 
suits in the district courts and the Court of Federal Claims.9  This 
Article contends that tax refund suits are governed by the six-year bar, 
no less than by the tax-specific statute of limitations, 26 U.S.C. 
(“I.R.C.”) § 6532(a)(1), which requires that a tax refund suit be filed 
no later than two years from the date the IRS mails notice of its 
disallowance of the underlying administrative claim.  The tax-specific 
provision states no limitation where a notice of disallowance has not 
been mailed, so an administrative claim that the IRS never disallows 
remains actionable indefinitely unless the general, six-year limitation 
applies. 
A tax refund suit pending in the Court of Federal Claims illustrates 
the problem with the prevailing tax exception to the six-year bar.  
Kerry Lynn Edwards claims she overpaid her federal taxes in the 
years 1998 through 2001 by a total of almost $80,000.10  She filed 
suit on August 5, 2009, more than six years after those claims 
accrued.11  Thus, according to the plain meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2501, 
Ms. Edwards’s claims are time-barred.  But the Department of Justice 
has not challenged the court’s jurisdiction on that ground, and the 
court so far has not raised the issue.12  The parties’ only jurisdictional 
dispute concerns whether Ms. Edwards filed timely administrative 
refund claims with the IRS, as required by I.R.C. § 7422(a), before 
she filed suit.13  Ms. Edwards admits she did not make a formal 
refund claim within three years of filing each return or within two 
 
8 Id. § 2501 (“Every claim of which the United States Court of Federal Claims has 
jurisdiction shall be barred unless the petition thereon is filed within six years after such 
claim first accrues.”). 
9 See infra Part I and notes 30, 61, 66.  The issue of the timeliness of a suit that claims 
an overpayment of tax might also arise in the Tax Court, which does have limited 
overpayment jurisdiction in its deficiency suits.  See 26 U.S.C. § 6512(b).  But like the 
district courts or the Court of Federal Claims, the Tax Court may not allow an 
overpayment “after the expiration of the period of limitation for filing suit.”  26 U.S.C. 
§ 6514(a)(2); see Brady v. Comm’r, 136 T.C. 19, at *5–6 (2011).  If 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) is 
an outside limit on that “period of limitation for filing [a refund] suit,” then refund claims 
prosecuted in the Tax Court are also subject to the six-year bar. 
10 Edwards v. United States, 92 Fed. Cl. 277, 278 (2010). 
11 Id. 
12 See id. at 280 n.6 (“The parties do not dispute that plaintiff timely filed her Complaint 
in the United States Court of Federal Claims.” (citing I.R.C. § 6532(a))). 
13 Id. at 281–82. 
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years of paying the tax for each year at issue.14  She argues that she 
satisfied the administrative claim requirement of § 6511 nonetheless 
by filing timely Form 4868 applications for extensions of time to file 
her returns and making other unspecified “submissions” to the IRS.15  
Considered together, Ms. Edwards contends, these filings constitute 
“informal claims for refund.”16  The court denied the Government’s 
motion to dismiss, permitting Ms. Edwards to try to prove through 
discovery that her submissions satisfied the informal claim doctrine.17  
Because the IRS did not recognize her submissions as refund claims, 
the agency did not render a decision on them.  In the absence of a 
notice of disallowance, the two-year, tax-specific limitation period of 
§ 6532(a)(1) never began to run.  Because the Government and the 
court do not enforce the six-year bar of § 2501, Ms. Edwards was free 
to file suit whenever she pleased, no matter how much time had 
passed since she submitted her informal refund claims.  If the six-year 
bar does not apply, a taxpayer can wait for decades before forcing the 
Government to litigate claims that, for whatever reason, the agency 
has never officially disallowed.18 
This result is contrary to sound administrative policy and contrary 
to the express intent of Congress.  Under the dual-limitation regime 
Congress enacted, a tax refund suit is untimely if it is filed later than 
either two years after the IRS mails a notice of disallowance or six 
years after the claim accrues—i.e., six-and-a-half years after the 
taxpayer’s timely administrative claim for refund.19  Even if Ms. 
 
14 Id. at 284; see I.R.C. § 6511(a). 
15 Edwards, 92 Fed. Cl. at 284. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 284–85; see infra notes 127–36 and accompanying text (discussing the informal 
claim doctrine). 
18 See infra note 65 (discussing Gillespie v. United States, No. 08-169 T (Fed. Cl. Nov. 
16, 2010)). 
19 A tax refund claim accrues six months after the taxpayer files an administrative claim 
with the IRS.  See I.R.C. § 7422(a) (prohibiting suit prior to filing an administrative claim 
for refund); id. § 6532(a)(1) (requiring that suit be filed no earlier than “6 months from the 
date of filing the [administrative] claim . . . unless the Secretary renders a decision thereon 
within that time”); see also Crown Coat Front Co. v. United States, 386 U.S. 503, 510 
(1967) (holding that under 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a), a suit is “barred if the right to bring it first 
accrued more than six years prior to the date of filing the suit”); Kahn v. United States, 55 
Ct. Cl. 271, 285 (1920), aff’d, 257 U.S. 244 (1921) (holding that a tax refund claim 
accrues six months after the filing of an administrative claim unless the administrative 
claim is disallowed before that time); Fort Pitt Gas Co. v. United States, 49 Ct. Cl. 224, 
235 (1914) (holding that “the cause of action accrued at the end of six months from” the 
date the taxpayer filed his application with the Commissioner); Breland v. United States, 
No. 5:10-CV-0007, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104499, *21 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2011); Goss 
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Edwards can prove she filed a timely informal refund claim that the 
IRS failed to disallow, her suit falls outside the six-year window of 28 
U.S.C. §§ 2501 and 2401(a) and thus outside the jurisdiction of the 
Court of Federal Claims and the district courts. 
Part I of this Article analyzes Detroit Trust Co. v. United States,20 
the 1955 Court of Claims case responsible for the prevailing view that 
the general statute of limitations has no application to tax refund 
litigation.  Using several mutually reinforcing canons of statutory 
construction, Part II explains why Detroit Trust was wrongly decided.  
Part III summarizes the long parallel histories of the general and tax-
specific statutes of limitations, in an effort to demonstrate their 
compatibility.  Part IV examines recent cases that point the way to 
restoring the general limitation in tax refund litigation.  These include 
United States v. Clintwood Elkhorn Mining Co., in which the 
Supreme Court stated in dicta that the six-year bar places an “outside 
limit” on the time during which a tax refund suit may be brought,21 
and Wagenet v. United States, in which the U.S. District Court for the 
Central District of California expressly held that it lacked jurisdiction 
over a tax refund suit brought after the six-year deadline.22  Part V 
recommends possible taxpayer-friendly approaches to enforcing the 
six-year bar in the IRS and in the courts. The agency may be able to 
systematically grant extensions of the limitation period to protect 
taxpayers’ reliance interests in Detroit Trust’s tax exception, and 
courts may be able to announce prospectively the applicability of the 
general statute of limitations to the tax context. 
I 
THE DETROIT TRUST TAX EXCEPTION TO THE SIX-YEAR BAR ON 
SUITS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT 
In Detroit Trust Co. v. United States,23 the Court of Claims held 
that only the I.R.C.’s two-year statute of limitations24 is relevant to 
 
v. United States, 293 F. Supp. 2d 816, 818 (N.D. Ohio 2003) (“[A] [refund] claim accrues 
‘when all events have occurred to fix the Government’s alleged liability, entitling the 
claimant to demand payment and sue for his money.’” (alteration omitted) (quoting 
Gerstein v. United States, 56 Fed. Cl. 630, 633 (2003))). 
20 130 F. Supp. 815 (Ct. Cl. 1955). 
21 553 U.S. 1, 8 (2008). 
22 No. SACV 08-00142 AG (ANx), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115547, at *3 (C.D. Cal. 
Sept. 14, 2009), appeal dismissed, No. 09-56800 (9th Cir. Dec. 7, 2010). 
23 130 F. Supp. 815 (Ct. Cl. 1955). 
24 Internal Revenue Code of 1939, ch. 37, § 3772(a)(2), 53 Stat. 1, 465 (codified at 26 
U.S.C. § 3772(a)(2)) (“No such suit or proceeding shall be begun before the expiration of 
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the question of when a taxpayer may file suit to recover taxes that the 
Government assessed or collected illegally.  This case reversed sub 
silentio previous Court of Claims authority suggesting the dual-
limitation view advocated in this Article.25  Under Detroit Trust, a 
taxpayer may bring suit anytime between six months after filing an 
administrative claim and two years after the IRS disallows that 
claim.26  Because Detroit Trust held the general limitation period to 
be inapplicable to tax refund suits,27 a long-delayed disallowance by 
the IRS is understood to start the clock on the tax-specific two-year 
statute of limitations,28 even if the underlying claim accrued more 
than six years earlier.  IRS guidance advises that if the Service never 
disallows a refund claim—even an informal claim that the IRS never 
recognizes as such29—the taxpayer may indefinitely sit on her right to 
sue.30  With one exception,31 commentators agree that the Detroit 
 
six months from the date of filing such claim unless the Commissioner renders a decision 
thereon within that time, nor after the expiration of two years from the date of mailing by 
registered mail by the Commissioner to the taxpayer of a notice of the disallowance of the 
part of the claim to which such suit or proceeding relates.”). 
25 See Fort Pitt Gas Co. v. United States, 49 Ct. Cl. 224, 234 (1914) (citing the in pari 
materia canon and the presumption against implied repeal for the point that the I.R.C. and 
Tucker Act statutes of limitations are “not necessarily inconsistent” with each other, and 
holding that the taxpayer’s suit was barred by the former); cf. infra Part II.C (presumption 
against implied repeal); infra Part II.D (in pari materia canon). 
26 Detroit Trust, 130 F. Supp. at 817. 
27 Id. at 817–18. 
28 I.R.C. § 6532(a)(1). 
29 See infra notes 127–36 and accompanying text (discussing the informal claim 
doctrine). 
30 See Rev. Rul. 56-381, 1956 C.B. 953 (stating that an Agreement to Suspend Running 
of Statute of Limitations is not necessary absent a registered notice of disallowance 
because “the period of limitations for filing suit does not commence in such a case”); 
I.R.S. Chief Couns. Advice Mem. 200202069, at 5 (Nov. 30, 2001) (“The 2-year 
limitations period in section 6532(a) will not start running . . . if the IRS does not issue a 
notice of claim disallowance and the taxpayer does not waive the right to a notice of claim 
disallowance.  This means that the period of limitations remains open indefinitely and the 
taxpayer could file a lawsuit many years after the taxpayer filed the claim with the IRS.” 
(citing Detroit Trust, 130 F. Supp. 815)), available at http://irs.gov/pub/irs-
sca/0202069.pdf; I.R.S. Field Serv. Advice Mem., 1998 FSA LEXIS 540 (Mar. 17, 1998) 
(“In the absence of [disallowance or waiver], it would appear the taxpayer would have an 
indefinite amount of time in which to file a refund suit.”); IRM 34.5.2.2(5) (Aug. 11, 
2004) (“The statute of limitations does not begin to run until the Service issues a notice of 
claim disallowance.”), available at http://www.irs.gov/irm/part34/irm_34-005-002.html; 
see also 1998 IRS Non Docketed Serv. Advice Rev. 5829, 1998 WL 1993209 (Mar. 17, 
1998) (taking this position but noting the contrary authority of Finkelstein v. United States, 
943 F. Supp. 425 (D.N.J. 1996)). 
31 MARTIN J. MCMAHON, JR. & LAWRENCE A. ZELENAK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 
OF INDIVIDUALS ¶ 49.08 (3d ed. 2003 & Supp. 2010) (“Section 6532 does not address the 
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Trust approach still governs tax refund suits, so the general, six-year 
limitation period does not bar such suits, no matter how long ago the 
underlying claim accrued.32 
In Detroit Trust, a trust company acting as the executor of an estate 
filed with the IRS an administrative refund claim in 1923 for tax 
assessed for the year 1917.33  The tax had been assessed against the 
decedent in connection with the reorganization of a company of 
which he was a stockholder.34  For more than two decades, the IRS 
took no action on the 1923 refund claim.35  In 1948, following the 
favorable resolution of a parallel suit brought by the trust company as 
 
applicable statute of limitations on a refund suit if the IRS simply fails to mail a notice of 
disallowance of a properly filed administrative refund claim.  In such a case, the generally 
applicable six-year period of limitations provided for suits against the United States in 28 
[U.S.C.] § 2401(a) applies.” (citing Wagenet v. United States, No. SACV 08-00142 AG 
(ANx), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115547 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2009))). 
32 See JACOB RABKIN & MARK H. JOHNSON, FEDERAL INCOME, GIFT, AND ESTATE 
TAXATION 5-80, § 80.05 (2d ed. 1985) (“Until [either the IRS sends the taxpayer a written 
notice of claim disallowance or the taxpayer files a written waiver of the notice], both the 
Service and the courts are in agreement that the limitations period does not start running 
and the taxpayer has an indefinite period in which to file suit.”); LEANDRA LEDERMAN & 
ANN MURPHY, FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 1–10, § 10.05 (2010) (same); 
WILLIAM D. ELLIOTT, FEDERAL TAX COLLECTIONS, LIENS & LEVIES ¶ 7.07[2][c] & n.287 
(2009 & Supp. 2010) (“Absent a notice of disallowance, a refund suit can be brought at 
any time. . . . Laches may be a bar, however, if the taxpayer has no reason to believe that 
the Service is continuing to evaluate the claim and the delay is egregious.”); MARVIN J. 
GARBIS ET AL., FEDERAL TAX LITIGATION ¶ 16.02[1], at 16-5 (1985) (“If no notification 
of claim disallowance is ever issued, and the claim is never formally rejected, the statutory 
period [for filing suit] never commences running.  Thus a cause of action can theoretically 
remain alive indefinitely.” (citing Detroit Trust, 130 F. Supp. 815)); MARVIN J. GARBIS & 
ALLEN L. SCHWAIT, TAX REFUND LITIGATION 56 (1971) (“If the Internal Revenue 
Service delays its action upon a claim for refund, no matter how long, the limitations 
period for suit still does not expire until two years after the claim is formally rejected or a 
waiver of notice of disallowance is filed.” (citing Detroit Trust, 130 F. Supp. 815)); 
GERALD A. KAFKA & RITA A. CAVANAGH, LITIGATION OF FEDERAL CIVIL TAX 
CONTROVERSIES ¶ 15.05 n.111 (2d ed. 1998 & Supp. 2010) (“If no claim disallowance is 
mailed, there is no period of limitations within which a refund [suit] must be brought.” 
(citing Detroit Trust, 130 F. Supp. 815)); MICHAEL I. SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE ¶ 11.11[2], at 11-118 (2009) (“If no notice of claim disallowance is sent, the 
two-year statute of limitations does not begin to run.”); THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
FEDERAL CLAIMS: A DESKBOOK FOR PRACTITIONERS 15 n.106 (4th ed. 1998) (“If no 
notice of disallowance is issued, then no limitation on the time for filing of a refund suit 
exists.” (citing Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. United States, 135 F. Supp. 881, 883 (Ct. Cl. 
1955))); see also Ronald A. Stein, Does Section 7426 Provide Exclusive Remedies for a 
Wrongful Levy?, 88 J. TAX’N 169, 169 (1998) (“[A] lawsuit to recover the tax normally 
may be commenced only if and when the IRS denies the claim.” (citing Detroit Trust, 130 
F. Supp. 815)). 
33 130 F. Supp. at 815. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 816. 
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executor of another estate, the plaintiff filed an amended refund 
claim.36  In 1951, twenty-eight years after the original administrative 
claim was filed, the IRS officially disallowed it.37  The trust company 
filed suit within two years of the belated disallowance, satisfying 
§ 3772, the predecessor to current § 6532(a)(1),38 but long after the 
expiration of the six-year statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2501.39  
The Court of Claims declared the suit timely.40 
In holding that “[t]he six-year statute of limitations does not 
apply,”41 the Court of Claims relied on language of the Supreme 
Court in United States v. Michel,42 which interpreted 26 U.S.C. § 156, 
the tax-specific statute of limitations that preceded § 3772 in Detroit 
Trust and § 6532(a)(1) in the current I.R.C.  Instead of a simple, two-
year, post-disallowance limit like that of its successors, former § 156 
allowed suit within the longer of five years after payment of the tax or 
two years after disallowance of the refund claim.43  In Michel, the 
Supreme Court disallowed two suits brought outside both of § 156’s 
limitation periods.44  In its analysis of § 156, the Court confirmed 
what was evident from the text of that statute: in the event of a belated 
disallowance, the two-year, post-disallowance limitation supplanted 
the five-year, post-payment limitation in the same statute. 
By the terms of [§ 156] the period within which the government 
consented to be sued commenced at the expiration of . . . six months 
[after the administrative claim was filed], and continued 
uninterruptedly through the five-year period following the date of 
payment and until “two years after the disallowance.”45 
 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. (citing I.R.C. § 3772 (1952)). 
39 Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2501 (1952)). 
40 Id. at 818. 
41 Id. 
42 282 U.S. 656 (1931). 
43 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 1014(a), R.S. § 3226, 43 Stat. 253, 343 (codified at 
26 U.S.C. § 156) (“No [tax refund] suit or proceeding shall be begun before the expiration 
of six months from the date of filing [an administrative refund claim] unless the 
[C]ommissioner renders a decision thereon within that time, nor after the expiration of five 
years from the date of the payment of such tax . . . unless such suit or proceeding is begun 
within two years after the disallowance of the part of such claim to which such suit or 
proceeding relates.”), quoted in Michel, 282 U.S. at 658. 
44 282 U.S. at 658. 
45 Id. at 659 (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 156).  The Michel Court’s notion that the post-
disallowance limit would extend the post-payment limit “uninterruptedly” rather than 
simply creating a second chance for the taxpayer to file suit upon disallowance was pure 
dicta: the taxpayers in that case filed suit after disallowance—not between the expiration 
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Because the IRS did not disallow the claims in Michel until after or 
soon before the expiration of § 156’s five-year limitation period,46 the 
two-year, post-disallowance limit extended the time in which a 
taxpayer could file suit over and above the five-year, post-payment 
limit.  Michel did not discuss the application of the general six-year 
limitation at all, presumably because each taxpayer filed suit within 
six years of the date his claim accrued.47 
Although the interaction of former § 156 with the general 
limitation is purely hypothetical, there is no compelling reason to 
believe the Michel Court would not have applied the latter as an 
alternative basis for decision if the taxpayers had filed suit more than 
six years after their claims accrued in 1924 and 1925.  More 
important, even if § 156 did trump the six-year bar, that fact would 
have no bearing on whether its simpler successor statutes did as well.  
A much stronger argument can be made for the implied repeal of the 
six-year bar by former § 156 than by current § 6532 and its immediate 
predecessors.  The Detroit Trust court erred in both respects: it 
misread Michel as stating that § 156 preempted the general limitation 
on claims against the government, and it misapplied that false premise 
to the significantly simplified tax-specific limitation then (as now) in 
effect. 
Detroit Trust transposed Michel’s treatment of § 156’s dual-
limitation scheme onto its successor statute, as if the same principle 
that made the two-year limitation in § 156 survive its own five-year 
limitation should apply to the relationship between the singular two-
year limitation of § 3772 and the entirely separate six-year limitation 
in title 28.  Detroit Trust’s reliance on Michel was misplaced.  The 
Court of Claims ignored important differences between § 156 and the 
present limitation regimes.  Unlike the tacit interaction between 
 
of the five-year, post-payment limit and disallowance.  Id. at 658.  Thus no case or 
controversy required a decision about the permissibility of a suit within the window 
between expiration of the five-year limit and disallowance.  Rather than an uninterrupted 
period in which suit would have been permitted, the text of § 156 indicates that whenever 
the IRS disallowed an administrative claim after the five-year limit, it created a new two-
year window in which to file suit—not an extension of the original limitation period. 
46 Both taxpayers in Michel paid the relevant tax on unspecified dates in 1920, and their 
administrative claims were disallowed on September 2, 1925, and April 20, 1925, 
respectively.  Id. at 657. 
47 The first taxpayer’s claim accrued on August 7, 1924 (six months after he filed his 
administrative claim for refund), and he filed suit sometime between September 3, 1927 
(“more than two years after the [disallowance]”), and June 27, 1930 (“less than two years 
after the notice[ of disallowance]”).  The second taxpayer’s claim accrued on March 15, 
1925, and he filed suit sometime between April 21, 1927, and June 27, 1930.  Id. 
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current § 6532 and the general six-year limit, the old § 156 had been 
explicit about the interrelation of its two limitation periods.  Section 
156 stated clearly that the two-year, post-disallowance limit could 
operate over and above the five-year limit: it prohibited suits filed 
“after the expiration of five years from the date of the payment of 
such tax . . . unless such suit or proceeding is begun within two years 
after the disallowance.”48  By contrast, current § 6532, like all of its 
predecessors since the Revenue Act of 1932,49 includes just a single 
post-disallowance limitation of two years and makes no mention of its 
trumping another statute of limitations.  The two- and five-year 
limitations in old § 156 are thus not analogous to the two- and six-
year limitations in current § 6532 and 28 U.S.C. § 2501. 
The short and somewhat cryptic Detroit Trust opinion seems to 
interpret legislative history to support its notion that the two-year, 
post-disallowance limitation in § 3226 overrode the six-year, post-
accrual limitation.50  The Senate Report said of the Senate version of 
the 1923 amendment to § 3226 that it would “permit bringing suits 
within two years after the disallowance of a claim, the statute of 
limitations notwithstanding . . . .”51  The Court of Claims implicitly 
read “the statute of limitations” as a reference to the six-year 
limitation in 28 U.S.C. § 2501.52  The better interpretation of that 
phrase, however, is that it refers to the I.R.C.’s own five-year, post-
payment limitation period then in effect.  The 1921 version of § 3226 
had included only a five-year, post-payment limitation, and the 1923 
amendment added the two-year, post-disallowance limitation that the 
Supreme Court interpreted in Michel.53  The Court of Claims arrived 
at its rather strained interpretation of the legislative history as 
referring to the general, six-year statute of limitations rather than the 
tax-specific, five-year limit by finding that the five-year limit was 
“not a statute of limitation within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 
 
48 26 U.S.C. § 156 (emphasis added). 
49 See infra Part III.B. 
50 130 F. Supp. 815, 817 n.3 (Ct. Cl. 1955). 
51 S. REP. NO. 67-1137, at 8 (1923) (emphasis added), cited in Detroit Trust, 130 F. 
Supp. at 817 n.3. 
52 See Detroit Trust, 130 F. Supp. at 817 n.3. 
53 26 U.S.C. § 3226 (1923) (“No such suit or proceeding shall be begun before the 
expiration of six months from the date of filing such claim unless the Commissioner 
renders a decision thereon within that time, nor after the expiration of five years from the 
date of the payment of such tax, penalty, or sum, unless such suit or proceeding is begun 
within two years after the disallowance . . . .”).  The five-year limitation period was 
deleted in the subsequent amendment.  Revenue Act of 1932, tit. 9, § 1103, 47 Stat. 269, 
286 (codified at R.S. § 3226). 
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§ 2501.”54  It cited Arnson v. Murphy55 and John F. Jelke Co. v. 
Smietanka,56 for this conclusion even though neither case stated that 
§ 3226 and its predecessors were not statutes of limitations.57 
There is no evidence that the Senate Finance Committee had in 
mind such a punctilious distinction when it said that disallowance 
created a two-year window in which the taxpayer could file suit “the 
statute of limitations notwithstanding.”  The theory that Congress did 
not consider § 3226 to be a statute of limitations is belied by the 
House Conference Report on the subsequent amendment to that 
statute, which explicitly called it a “statute of limitations.”58  The 
Detroit Trust court failed to consider this contrary legislative history 
from the House of Representatives when it relied on the prior Senate 
Report.59  The Court of Claims’ innovation in Detroit Trust is not 
supported by the legislative history of the tax-specific statute of 
limitations.  Instead, that legislative history is consistent with a dual-
limitation scheme in which the general and tax-specific statutes of 
limitations operate in tandem.  By 1955, when Detroit Trust was 
decided, the general and tax-specific statutes of limitations had both 
been reenacted and amended repeatedly over many decades with no 
mention of limiting the other’s effect.60 
 
54 Detroit Trust, 130 F. Supp. at 817. 
55 109 U.S. 238 (1883). 
56 86 F.2d 470 (7th Cir. 1936). 
57 Arnson interpreted a similar waiver of sovereign immunity allowing suit for 
erroneously exacted duties within prescribed time limits.  109 U.S. at 240–41 (citing 13 
Stat. 202 (1864)); see also Arnson v. Murphy, 115 U.S. 579, 584 (1885) (stating that 
failure to comply with the limitation period need not be “pleaded by the defendant as a 
statute of limitation” because “[t]he right of action does not exist independently of the 
statute, but is conferred by it”).  However, the Court never hinted that the limit on duty 
actions is not a statute of limitations.  Similarly, in John F. Jelke Co. v. Smietanka, the 
Seventh Circuit distinguished a limitation period that limits the remedy from one that 
limits liability itself, characterizing § 3226 as being of the latter variety.  86 F.2d at 471–
72.  The distinction drawn in these cases is relevant to whether the Government must raise 
the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense—not whether the statute is a statute of 
limitations in the first place. 
58 H.R. REP. NO. 72-1492, at 28 (1932) (Conf. Rep.).  The courts have consistently 
recognized § 6532 and its predecessors as statutes of limitations.  See United States v. A.S. 
Kreider Co., 313 U.S. 443, 447 (1941) (holding that the predecessor to § 6532 imposes a 
“different and shorter period of limitation” than the Tucker Act); RHI Holdings, Inc. v. 
United States, 142 F.3d 1459, 1461 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“The statute of limitations applying 
to [the taxpayer’s] refund claim filed in the Court of Federal Claims is 26 U.S.C. 
§ 6532.”); Gordon v. United States, 649 F.2d 837, 844 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (“In seeking a refund 
of taxes . . . a taxpayer must ascribe to the period of limitation established by I.R.C. 
§§ 6511(a) and 6532(a) . . . .”). 
59 See 130 F. Supp. at 817 n.3. 
60 See infra Part III. 
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The Detroit Trust tax exception to the six-year statute of 
limitations was upheld in several subsequent Court of Claims cases,61 
and it is binding on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit62 and on the Court of Federal Claims, whose appeals are to the 
Federal Circuit.63  Because the Court of Federal Claims shares its tax-
refund jurisdiction with the federal district courts,64 the Article III 
courts have also had to wrestle with the relationship between the tax-
specific and general statutes of limitations.  Unfortunately, by 
effectively acquiescing in Detroit Trust, the IRS has provided little 
incentive to challenge its holding.  As a rule, the Government does 
not raise the general statute of limitations as a defense even in cases 
filed many more than six years after the claim accrues.65  Deferring to 
the expertise of the Federal Circuit and its predecessors, the courts 
have largely followed the rule that the six-year bar does not apply in 
 
61 See Gordon, 649 F.2d at 844 (“In seeking a refund of taxes, for example, a taxpayer 
must ascribe to the period of limitation established by I.R.C. §§ 6511(a) and 6532(a) rather 
than the general 6-year period of 28 U.S.C. §§ 2501 and 2401.”); Alexander Proudfoot Co. 
v. United States, 454 F.2d 1379, 1380 (Ct. Cl. 1972) (“[I]f the special tax requirements are 
applicable, they dominate and exclude the general pre-conditions for suit against the 
United States.”); Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. United States, 135 F. Supp. 881, 883 (Ct. 
Cl. 1955) (“[The I.R.C. statute of limitations] was the governing statute of limitations and . 
. . the six-year statute of limitations contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2501 was not applicable.”  
(citing Detroit Trust, 130 F. Supp. 815)); see also Hampton v. United States, 513 F.2d 
1234, 1243 (Ct. Cl. 1975) (“Plaintiff’s argument that refunds under [26 U.S.C.] § 692(1) 
are governed by the 6-year period of limitations prescribed in 28 U.S.C. § 2401, the 
general statute of limitations for civil actions against the United States, is based upon the 
incorrect assumption that the filing of a claim for the ‘refund of an overpayment’ is not 
required under § 692(1).”). 
62 See S. Corp. & Seal Fleet, Inc. v. United States, 690 F. 2d 1368, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 
1982). 
63 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3). 
64 See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1). 
65 For example, the Department of Justice settled a case with more than $100,000 at 
stake even though the underlying refund claims had been filed more than twenty-five years 
earlier, because the IRS could not prove it had mailed a notice of disallowance.  See 
Complaint at 4, ¶ 16, Gillespie v. United States, No. 08-169 T (Ct. Fed. Cl. Mar. 14, 
2008), ECF No. 1-8 (“On April 8, 1982, the Trust claimed a refund of an overpayment of 
tax for the 1978 and 1979 tax years.”); id. at 10, ¶ 45 (“The Internal Revenue Service has 
not provided the Plaintiffs with any proof that the June 24, 2003 [disallowance] letter was 
sent to the Plaintiffs.”); Joint Preliminary Status Report at 1, Gillespie, No. 08-169 T 
(Sept. 4, 2008), ECF No. 7 (“At this time, the United States does not expect to contend 
that the Court is without jurisdiction.”); Joint Status Report at 1, Gillespie, No. 08-169 T 
(Nov. 16, 2010), ECF No. 31 (“Defendant has recently mailed refund checks to plaintiffs’ 
counsel based on the settlement.”).  But see Motion to Dismiss at 6, Wagenet v. United 
States, No. SACV 08-00142 AG (ANx) (C.D. Cal. June 3, 2009), ECF No. 14 (Assistant 
United States Attorney’s argument that 28 U.S.C. § 2501 barred the tax refund suit). 
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tax refund litigation.66  In so holding, however, they have neglected 
its explicit scope: “every civil action commenced against the United 
States.”67 
II 
A CANON-BASED RECONSTRUCTION OF THE DUAL-LIMITATION 
SCHEME FOR TAX REFUND SUITS 
This Article’s proposed restoration of the general statute of 
limitations to tax refund litigation comports with the traditional tools 
of statutory construction, whereas Detroit Trust is at odds with them.  
Canons of statutory construction have been disparaged because too 
often they seem arbitrary and even contradictory.68  Sometimes, 
though, the canons applicable to a given statutory problem reinforce 
rather than undermine one another.  That is so here.  Multiple canons 
support the application of the six-year bar as an outside limit in tax 
refund litigation. 
 
66 See Bruno v. United States, 547 F.2d 71, 73 (8th Cir. 1976) (“[Section] 2401 does not 
apply to actions for tax refunds, which are governed by the more specific period of 
limitation set forth in §§ 6511 and 7422 of the [I.R.C.]”); Phoenix State Bank & Trust Co. 
v. Bitgood, 28 F. Supp. 899, 900 (D. Conn. 1939) (“While the plaintiff bases its authority 
for bringing an action against the United States in the District Court on the provisions of 
28 U.S.C.A. § 41(20) [predecessor to § 2401], the six year limitation prescribed therein 
must yield before the more specific limitation of two years found in 26 U.S.C.A.  
§§ 1672–1673.  Actions against the United States under 28 U.S.C.A. § 41(20) for internal 
revenue taxes erroneously collected have been held to be subject to the shorter time 
limitation.”).  But see Wagenet v. United States, No. SACV 08-00142 AG (ANx), 2009 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115547, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2009) (“Bruno, Hampton [v. United 
States, 513 F.2d 1234 (Fed. Cir. 1975),] and Phoenix State Bank each involved plaintiffs 
arguing § 2401(a) allowed refund actions against the United States for six years after 
accrual despite the existence of other statutes with shorter limitations periods.”); infra Part 
IV.B–C (discussing Wagenet, Finkelstein v. United States, 943 F. Supp. 425, 432 (D.N.J. 
1996), and Breland v. United States, No. 5:10-CV-0007, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104499, 
*21-22 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2011)). 
67 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a). 
68 Karl Llewellyn famously listed the canons of construction in two parallel columns 
with a parry for every thrust.  Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate 
Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. 
REV. 395, 401–06 (1950).  Llewellyn’s approach has been criticized as selective and 
overly cynical. See Michael Sinclair, “Only a Sith Thinks Like That”: Llewellyn’s 
“Dueling Canons,” One to Seven, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 919 (2005–2006); Michael 
Sinclair, “Only a Sith Thinks Like That”: Llewellyn’s “Dueling Canons,” Eight to Twelve, 
51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1003 (2006–2007); Michael Sinclair, “Only a Sith Thinks Like 
That”: Llewellyn’s “Dueling Canons,” Pairs Thirteen to Sixteen, 53 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 
953 (2008–2009). 
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A.  Plain Meaning 
When federal courts interpret acts of Congress, they start from the 
presumption that Congress means what it says.  As the Supreme Court 
has said, “In cases of statutory construction we begin, of course, with 
the language of the statute.  And ‘unless otherwise defined, words 
will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common 
meaning.’”69  With one explicit exception not pertinent here,70 
§§ 2401 and 2501 purport to apply their six-year limitation to 
“[e]very claim” and “every civil action” brought against the United 
States in the district courts and Court of Federal Claims.71  This is an 
“unexceptional” statute of limitations72 whose plain meaning 
embraces tax refund suits—the quintessential claim against the 
Government.73  Indeed, it is hard to imagine how Congress could 
have given the six-year limitation a broader scope than by applying it 
to “[e]very claim” and “every civil action” against the United 
States.74  Following this plain meaning, the Federal Circuit interprets 
28 U.S.C. § 2501 to bar late-filed suits in virtually every area of 
federal claims litigation except for tax.75  Even claims for interest on 
 
69 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980) (citation omitted) (quoting Perrin 
v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979)); Perrin, 444 U.S. at 42 (describing this as “[a] 
fundamental canon of statutory construction”); see Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug 
Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975) (“The starting point in every case involving construction 
of a statute is the language itself.”); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) 
(“It is elementary that the meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the 
language in which the act is framed, and if that is plain, . . . the sole function of the courts 
is to enforce it according to its terms.”); see also Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 576 
(1988) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“The Court begins, as is proper, with the plain meaning 
of the statutory language.”); Lindahl v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 470 U.S. 768, 801 (1985) 
(White, J., dissenting) (“A more conventional reading of the statute [is] one that takes as 
its starting point the plain meaning of the statutory language.”). 
70 See infra Part II.E (discussing the Contract Disputes Act of 1978 and its introduction 
of an explicit exception to the six-year limitation for government contract suits). 
71 See 28 U.S.C. § 2401 (barring “every civil action commenced against the United 
States” more than six years “after the right of action first accrues,” “[e]xcept as provided 
by the Contract Disputes Act of 1978”); id. § 2501 (barring “[e]very claim of which the 
United States Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction . . . unless the petition thereon is 
filed within six years after such claim first accrues”). 
72 Franconia Assocs. v. United States, 536 U.S. 129, 145 (2002). 
73 Tax refund suits were among the earliest suits heard in the Court of Claims.  See infra 
notes 158, 159 and accompanying text. 
74 28 U.S.C. §§ 2401(a), 2501; cf. United States v. Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 
441, 454 (1953) (Clark, J., dissenting) (“It would be difficult for Congress to be more 
explicit than to direct the statute’s mandate, as it has here, to ‘every’ manufacturer and 
dealer without qualification.”) (interpreting 15 U.S.C. § 1173 (1951)). 
75 See, e.g., Ingrum v. United States, 560 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (land takings); 
Young v. United States, 529 F.3d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Veterans Affairs); W. Shoshone 
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a belated tax refund are subject to the six-year bar.76  The statute itself 
suggests no reason why tax refund suits should be treated any 
differently. 
Where the meaning of a statute is unambiguous, courts should have 
no need to resort to other canons of statutory construction.77  But 
since the meaning of a statutory provision is seldom indisputably 
clear, plain meaning is rarely the end of statutory construction.78  
Even if there is some ambiguity about the six-year bar’s stated 
application to “every civil action commenced against the United 
States,”79 the other tools of statutory construction confirm that this 
 
Nat’l Council v. United States, 279 F. App’x 980 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Indian Claims 
Commission appeal); Wilder v. United States, 277 F.App’x 999 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (federal 
employment); Zakiya v. United States, 277 F. App’x 985 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (unjust 
imprisonment); Glaude v. United States, 248 F. App’x 175 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Merit System 
Protection Board appeal); see also Bonwit Teller & Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 258 
(1931) (suit on an account stated). 
76 See Gen. Elec. v. United States, 384 F.3d 1307, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[T]he statute 
of limitations for collecting interest on an overpayment [pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6611] is 
not the three-year limitations period applicable to recovery of the overpayment itself, 26 
U.S.C. § 6511, but the general six-year statute that applies to suits against the government, 
28 U.S.C. § 2401.  The principle underlying that distinction is that an overpayment is a 
payment that relates to a tax obligation, while interest on an overpayment is simply a 
general debt of the government, which is not subject to the special rules associated with 
the adjustment and collection of obligations under the tax laws.”). 
77 Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 475 (1992) (“In a statutory 
construction case, the beginning point must be the language of the statute, and when a 
statute speaks with clarity to an issue judicial inquiry into the statute's meaning, in all but 
the most extraordinary circumstance, is finished.”); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 
470, 485 (1917) (“Where the language is plain and admits of no more than one meaning 
the duty of interpretation does not arise, and the rules which are to aid doubtful meanings 
need no discussion.”), cited in Carcieri v. Salazar, 129 S. Ct. 1058, 1064 (2009), and 
Jimenez v. Quarterman, 129 S. Ct. 681, 685 (2009). 
78 See Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 266 (1981) (“[T]he plain-meaning rule is ‘rather an 
axiom of experience than a rule of law, and does not preclude consideration of persuasive 
evidence if it exists.’” (quoting Boston Sand Co. v. United States, 278 U.S. 41, 48 
(1928))); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 13 (1980) (“Although plain meaning is always 
the starting point, this Court rarely ignores available aids to statutory construction.” 
(citation omitted)); see also Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co. v. United States, 352 U.S. 128, 138 
(1956) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“Of course one begins with the words of a statute to 
ascertain its meaning, but one does not end with them.  The notion that the plain meaning 
of the words of a statute defines the meaning of the statute reminds one of T.H. Huxley’s 
gay observation that at times ‘a theory survives long after its brains are knocked out.’  One 
would suppose that this particular theory of statutory construction had had its brains 
knocked out in Boston Sand & Gravel Co. . . . .”). 
79 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a). 
GUSTAFSON 10/28/2011  10:32 AM 
2011] An “Outside Limit” for Refund Suits 207 
phrase includes tax refund claims.80  Courts should be especially slow 
to contradict a statute’s ordinary meaning under such circumstances. 
B.  Giving Effect to Every Word 
Closely related to the plain meaning presumption is the rule that “a 
court should give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a 
statute.”81  By inferring an exception for tax refund suits, Detroit 
Trust, which declined to quote 28 U.S.C. § 2501 while holding it 
inapplicable to the tax context, failed to give the word “every” any 
meaning whatsoever.  The expansive language Congress used—
“[e]very civil action commenced against the United States”82—
militates against any qualification on the scope of the six-year bar.83  
If Congress had intended to create a mere presumption that claims 
against the government are barred after six years, rebuttable by the 
existence of any other applicable limitation period, Congress would 
not have emphasized the limitation’s application to “[e]very claim.”84 
C.  Presumption Against Implied Repeal 
Detroit Trust inferred what later Court of Claims cases stated 
explicitly: that the I.R.C.’s context-specific statute of limitations for 
suits founded on tax refund claims (first enacted in 1866) implies an 
exception to the general, six-year statute of limitations (first enacted 
 
80 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 686 
(1990) (proposing that canons of statutory construction should be used in conjunction with 
a statute’s plain language to determine statutory meaning). 
81 Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 109 (1990) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
82 28 U.S.C. § 2501 (emphasis added). 
83 Cf. United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997) (“The question we face is whether 
the phrase ‘any other term of imprisonment’ means what it says, or whether it should be 
limited to some subset of prison sentences—namely, only federal sentences. Read 
naturally, the word ‘any’ has an expansive meaning . . . .  Congress did not add any 
language limiting the breadth of that word, and so we must read § 924(c) as referring to all 
‘term[s] of imprisonment,’ including those imposed by state courts.” (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted)); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 559 (1967) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting) (“To most, ‘every person’ would mean every person, not every person except 
judges.”); Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 51 (1949) (“The statute’s terms are clear.  
They provide for District Court jurisdiction over any claim founded on negligence brought 
against the United States.  We are not persuaded that ‘any claim’ means ‘any claim but 
that of servicemen.’  The statute does contain twelve exceptions.  None exclude 
petitioners’ claims.”). 
84 28 U.S.C. § 2501 (emphasis added). 
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in 1863).85  This suggestion of an implied amendment contravenes the 
Supreme Court’s repeated admonition “that absent a clearly 
established congressional intention, repeals by implication are not 
favored.”86  The presumption against implied repeal applies with 
equal force against implied statutory amendments.87  The Supreme 
Court has applied this canon to preserve Tucker Act takings remedies 
from implied repeal by other federal statutes88 and to preserve 
context-specific statutes of limitations from implied repeal by the 
Tucker Act’s general, six-year limitation.89  The Court of Claims’ 
 
85 See Alexander Proudfoot Co. v. United States, 454 F.2d 1379, 1380 (Ct. Cl. 1972) 
(“[I]f the special tax requirements are applicable, they dominate and exclude the general 
pre-conditions for suit against the United States.”). 
86 Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 273 (2003) (plurality opinion) (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Burroughs, 289 U.S. 159, 164 (1933) 
(“Implied repeals are not favored; and if effect can reasonably be given to both statutes, 
the presumption is that the earlier is to remain in force.”). 
87 See Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 664 n.8 
(2007) (“It does not matter whether this alteration is characterized as an amendment or a 
partial repeal.  Every amendment of a statute effects a partial repeal to the extent that the 
new statutory command displaces earlier, inconsistent commands, and we have repeatedly 
recognized that implied amendments are no more favored than implied repeals.” (citing 
Reg’l Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 134 (1974) (“‘A new statute will not 
be read as wholly or even partially amending a prior one unless there exists a ‘positive 
repugnancy’ between the provisions of the new and those of the old that cannot be 
reconciled’”); United States v. Welden, 377 U.S. 95, 103 n.12 (1964) (“Amendments by 
implication . . . are not favored”))); 1A NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, 
STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 22.30 (7th ed. 2009 & Supp. 2010) 
(“[T]here is a presumption against the implied repeal or amendment of any existing 
statutory provision.” (footnote omitted)). 
88 See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1017–18 (1984) (rejecting a 
contention that the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) repealed 
by implication a Tucker Act remedy for governmental taking of property without just 
compensation, and reconciling the two statutes by implying a requirement that remedies 
under FIFRA must be exhausted before relief under the Tucker Act could be obtained); id. 
at 1017 (“In determining whether a Tucker Act remedy is available for claims arising out 
of a taking pursuant to a federal statute, the proper inquiry is not whether the statute 
‘expresses an affirmative showing of congressional intent to permit recourse to a Tucker 
Act remedy,’ but ‘whether Congress has in the [statute] withdrawn the Tucker Act grant of 
jurisdiction to the Court of Claims to hear a suit involving the [statute] founded . . . upon 
the Constitution.’” (quoting Reg’l Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. at 126) 
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
89 See United States v. Greathouse, 166 U.S. 601, 605 (1897) (“The [Tucker A]ct of 
1887 only superseded such previous legislation as was inconsistent with its provisions.  It 
is true that if that act be literally construed, there is some ground for holding that Congress 
intended by the proviso of section 1 to cover the whole subject of the limitation of suits 
against the Government, in whatever court instituted.  But we cannot suppose that it was 
intended to strike down the exceptions made in section 1069 of the Revised Statutes [the 
six-year statute of limitations that preceded the Tucker Act] in favor of ‘the claims of 
married women first accrued during marriage, of persons under the age of twenty-one 
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suggestion that 26 U.S.C. § 3226, predecessor to § 6532, impliedly 
amended 28 U.S.C. § 2501 was and remains unjustified, because both 
statutes of limitations can function in parallel: “An implied repeal will 
only be found where provisions in two statutes are in irreconcilable 
conflict, or where the latter Act covers the whole subject of the earlier 
one and is clearly intended as a substitute.”90 
It is true as a general rule that “a specific statute will not be 
controlled or nullified by a general one.”91  If applying the six-year 
limitation in the tax context were to thwart the application of the tax-
specific limitation, this principle would favor the application of 
§ 6532 as a replacement for the general statute of limitations.  But this 
principle only applies when the statutes are actually incompatible 
with one another.92  “It is not enough to show that the two statutes 
produce differing results when applied to the same factual situation, 
for that no more than states the problem.  Rather, ‘when two statutes 
are capable of co-existence, it is the duty of the courts . . . to regard 
each as effective.’”93  In this case, the general and tax-specific 
limitations are fully compatible with one another because they are 
triggered by different events—accrual and disallowance.94  As the 
Eighth Circuit held long before Detroit Trust, 
 
years first accrued during minority, and of idiots, lunatics, insane persons, and persons 
beyond the seas at the time the claim accrued.’  Those exceptions were not expressly 
abrogated by the act of 1887, and they could be held to be repealed only by implication.  
But repeals by implication are not favored, and when two statutes cover in whole or in part 
the same matter, and are not absolutely irreconcilable, effect should be given, if possible, 
to both of them.”). 
90 Branch, 538 U.S. at 273 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
91 Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550–51 (1974); see also Morales v. Trans World 
Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 384 (1992) (“It is a commonplace of statutory construction 
that the specific governs the general.”). 
92 See St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, 451 U.S. 772, 788 
(1981) (It is a “long-established canon of construction” that “‘[i]n the absence of some 
affirmative showing of an intention to repeal, the only permissible justification for a repeal 
by implication is when the earlier and later statutes are irreconcilable.’” (quoting Morton, 
417 U.S. at 550)); see also Morton, 417 U.S. at 550 (“When there are two acts upon the 
same subject, the rule is to give effect to both if possible.  The intention of the legislature 
to repeal must be clear and manifest.” (quoting United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 
198 (1939)) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
93 Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 155 (1976) (quoting Morton, 417 
U.S. at 551). 
94 Compare 28 U.S.C. §§ 2401(a), 2501, with I.R.C. § 6532.  From the beginning, the 
general and tax-specific statutes of limitations have been compatible because they measure 
from accrual and disallowance respectively.  Compare An Act To Amend “An Act To 
Establish a Court for the Investigation of Claims Against the United States,” ch. 92, sec. 
10, 12 Stat. 765, 767 (1863) (codified at R.S. § 1069) (“[E]very claim against the United 
States, cognizable by the court of claims, shall be forever barred unless the petition setting 
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[T]here is certainly no repugnancy between a general law to the 
effect that no action upon any of several classes of claims shall be 
brought after six years from the accrual of the cause of action, and a 
statute that no action upon any of a specific class of these claims 
shall be sustained unless it is commenced within two years of the 
time when the cause of action arose; and, as there is no 
inconsistency between the two limitations, the [Tucker A]ct of 1887 
neither repealed nor modified the provision of section 3227 [of the 
Revised Statutes, predecessor to 26 U.S.C. § 6532(a)].95 
Because both statutes of limitations can operate in tandem, courts 
have no reason to resort to the preference for specific statutes over 
general ones. 
In Hinck v. United States, the Supreme Court articulated in the tax 
context the principle that “in most contexts, a precisely drawn, 
detailed statute pre-empts more general remedies.”96  The Court 
applied this principle to hold that Congress’s specific grant to the Tax 
Court of jurisdiction over interest-abatement claims in I.R.C. 
§ 6404(h) impliedly precluded jurisdiction over such claims in the 
Court of Federal Claims and the district courts.97  The Supreme Court 
concluded that 
the implied-repeal doctrine is not applicable here, for when 
Congress passed § 6404(h), § 6404(e)(1) [providing for abatement 
of interest by the IRS] had been interpreted not to provide any right 
of review for taxpayers.  There is thus no indication of any language 
on the statute books that Congress wished to change, implicitly or 
explicitly.  Congress simply prescribed a limited form of review 
where none had previously been found to exist.98 
Thus, Hinck stands for the proposition that the specific terms of a 
novel statutory remedy may preclude (and, by arguable extension, 
may impliedly repeal) any general remedy that would otherwise arise 
 
forth a statement of the claim be filed in the court or transmitted to it under the provisions 
of this act within six years after the claim first accrues.”), with Act of July 13, 1866, ch. 
184, § 19, 14 Stat. 98, 152 (“[N]o suit shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of 
any tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, until appeal 
shall have been duly made to the commissioner of internal revenue according to the 
provisions of law in that regard, and the regulations of the Secretary of the Treasury 
established in pursuance thereof, and a decision of said commissioner shall be had thereon, 
unless such suit shall be brought within six months from the time of said decision, or 
within six months from the time this act takes effect: Provided, That if said decision shall 
be delayed more than six months from the date of such appeal, then said suit may be 
brought at any time within twelve months from the date of such appeal.”). 
95 Christie-St. Comm’n Co. v. United States, 136 F. 326, 332–33 (8th Cir. 1905). 
96 550 U.S. 501, 506 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
97 Id. at 503. 
98 Id. at 508 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). 
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from the waiver of sovereign immunity that enabled the specific 
remedy.99  More broadly, Hinck may be thought to stand for the 
proposition that specific tax rules moot non-tax rules.  Hinck does not 
go so far, however, and the actual reasoning of Hinck does not apply 
to the dual-limitation scheme defended here. 
First, the general and tax-specific statutes of limitations prescribe 
not remedies but limitations on remedies created elsewhere.100  Hinck 
simply restated the “elemental canon of statutory construction that 
where a statute expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, a 
court must be chary of reading others into it.”101  The Hinck 
petitioners argued that Congress broadly waived its immunity to 
interest-abatement claims for all purposes through the specific cause 
of action it assigned to the Tax Court.  The Hinck Court rejected that 
argument, because the cause of action in which the petitioners 
proposed to locate an all-purpose waiver of sovereign immunity was 
“a carefully circumscribed, time-limited, plaintiff-specific provision, 
which also precisely defined the appropriate forum.”102  It was 
implausible that Congress had intended to give jurisdiction to the 
Court of Federal Claims and the district courts through such a specific 
statute.  The interaction of two statutes of limitations that are 
compatible with one another does not give rise to the incongruence 
(criticized in Hinck) of attempting to derive a broad remedy from the 
narrow remedy prescribed by Congress.  The application of the 
general, six-year limitation to tax refund suits does no violence to its 
explicit scope (“every civil action”).103 
Second, the Court’s reason for not applying the presumption 
against implied repeal in Hinck—the absence of a preexisting cause of 
action for interest abatement104—does not apply to 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 2401(a) and 2501.  The six-year bar had never been interpreted as 
having a tax exception until, in 1955, Detroit Trust decided that the 
 
99 See id. at 506 (“[W]hen Congress enacts a specific remedy when no remedy was 
previously recognized, or when previous remedies were ‘problematic,’ the remedy 
provided is generally regarded as exclusive.”). 
100 See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (giving the Court of Federal Claims jurisdiction over 
claims against the Government); id. § 1346(a)(1) (giving the district courts concurrent 
jurisdiction with the Court of Federal Claims over tax refund suits). 
101 Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19 (1979). 
102 Hinck, 550 U.S. at 507. 
103 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a). 
104 Hinck, 550 U.S. at 506 (“Congress enacted [§ 6404(h)] against a backdrop of 
decisions uniformly rejecting the possibility of any review for taxpayers wishing to 
challenge the Secretary’s § 6404(e)(1) determination.”). 
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tax-specific statute of limitations enacted in 1866 had created one.105  
The six-year limitation on all federal claims jurisdiction, which was 
enacted in 1863 and thus preceded the tax-specific statute of 
limitations,106 is therefore unlike the hypothetical cause of action for 
abatement of interest rejected in Hinck, which had already been 
rejected before the passage of § 6404(h). 
Since there is not the least repugnancy between the statutes of 
limitations in titles 26 and 28 (and since the six-year statute has been 
repeatedly amended with no indication that it has been partially 
repealed),107 there is no reason to believe that the tax-specific 
limitation in I.R.C. § 6532 impliedly narrows the stated application of 
28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) to “every civil action commenced against the 
United States.”  Therefore, both statutes should be construed to limit 
tax refund suits independently. 
D.  In Pari Materia 
A complementary principle to the presumption against implied 
repeal is the in pari materia canon whereby courts interpret related 
statutes together,108 presuming “that whenever the legislature enacts a 
provision it has in mind previous statutes relating to the same subject 
matter.”109  Thus, a statute is presumed to be “in accord with the 
legislative policy embodied in” a prior, related statute,110 and “if it is 
possible by reasonable construction, both are construed so that effect 
is given to every provision in all of them.”111  Instead of seeking out 
statutory conflicts where none exist, courts should strive to interpret 
 
105 Detroit Trust Co. v. United States, 130 F. Supp. 815, 817 (Ct. Cl. 1955). 
106  See An Act To Amend “An Act To Establish a Court for the Investigation of Claims 
Against the United States,” ch. 92, sec. 10, 12 Stat. 765, 767 (1863); infra Part III. 
107 Cf. Karen Petroski, Comment, Retheorizing the Presumption Against Implied 
Repeals, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 487, 527 (2004) (arguing that the presumption against implied 
repeal should be weaker if “the older statute has not recently been enforced, amended, or 
discussed”).  The present version of the six-year statute was reenacted in 1992. 
108 See Wachovia Bank, Nat’l Ass’n v. Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303, 315–16 (2006) 
(“[U]nder the in pari materia canon of statutory construction, statutes addressing the same 
subject matter generally should be read ‘as if they were one law.’” (quoting Erlenbaugh v. 
United States, 409 U.S. 239, 243 (1972))); Allen v. Grand Cent. Aircraft Co., 347 U.S. 
535, 541 (1954) (“To read the Defense Production Act of 1950 without reference to [the 
Stabilization Act of 1942] is to read it out of the context in which Congress enacted it.”). 
109 2B NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION § 51:2 (7th ed. 2009 & Supp. 2010). 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
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related statutes wherever possible in a matter that renders them 
mutually compatible.112 
The general and tax-specific statutes of limitations should be read 
in pari materia because they deal with the same general subject 
matter—time limits for filing claims against the Government.113  
Indeed, “suit[s] or proceeding[s] . . . for the recovery of any internal 
revenue tax, penalty, or other sum”114 are just a subset of “every civil 
action commenced against the United States.”115  The latter subsumes 
the former entirely. 
Reading these two limitation schemes “as if they were one law” 
reveals no conflict between them.116  Each limits the Government’s 
exposure to a term of years beginning at disparate starting points.  
The general limitation protects the Government against all potential 
claims based on their date of accrual.  The tax-specific limitation is 
appropriately shorter than the general limitation because it is initiated 
by the mailing of notice to the taxpayer, which is preceded by the 
taxpayer’s own administrative claim.  In the absence of disallowance, 
the taxpayer has a longer opportunity to persuade the IRS of his 
entitlement to a refund before filing suit, but the six-year bar prevents 
indefinite delay.  Nothing in the tax-specific limitation absolves tax 
refund claimants of their obligation to file suit within six years of 
accrual, and there is no “plain inconsistency” to be found between the 
purposes of the two statutes of limitations.117  Both should therefore 
be given their full effect. 
 
112 See Maiatico v. United States, 302 F.2d 880, 886 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (“It is our duty 
whenever possible to reconcile provisions of varying statutes when and to the extent that 
conflict may appear.”). 
113 Cf. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 61 (2006) (refusing to read 
a subject-matter limitation in Title VII’s antidiscrimination provision into its antiretaliation 
provision because “[t]he language of the [antidiscrimination] provision differs from that of 
the antiretaliation provision in important ways”); Wachovia Bank, 546 U.S. at 319 
(refusing to “[t]reat[] venue and subject-matter jurisdiction prescriptions as in pari 
materia” because doing so would “overlook[] the discrete offices of those concepts”). 
114 I.R.C. § 6532(a)(1). 
115 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a). 
116 Wachovia Bank, 546 U.S. at 316. 
117 United States v. Key, 397 U.S. 322, 329 (1970) (citing United States v. Emory, 314 
U.S. 423, 430 (1941)).  In Key, the Court applied two related statutes to Chapter X 
bankruptcy proceedings—giving the United States rights to priority of satisfaction and to 
“payment” of its tax claims—because they were not logically inconsistent and served 
distinct purposes.  Id. at 328–29.  The Court explained that “[s]eparate provisions to this 
effect in the same statute could certainly be read in harmony with each other, and there is 
no reason why § 3466 should not be read to supplement the requirement of payment 
contained in § 199 in the same fashion.”  Id. at 328. 
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E.  Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius 
The continued adherence of the federal courts to Detroit Trust is 
unconvincing in part because, in the course of decades of parallel 
amendments and reenactments since that decision, Congress has 
never ratified the Court of Claims’ interpretation of the six-year 
statute of limitations by excluding tax refund suits from “every civil 
action commenced against the United States.”  That omission is all 
the more telling in light of Congress’s explicit exception to the six-
year limitation for government contract suits.  When Congress passed 
the Contract Disputes Act of 1978, with its own unique limitation 
scheme,118 Congress simultaneously amended 28 U.S.C. § 2401 by 
inserting the introductory phrase, “Except as provided by the Contract 
Disputes Act of 1978.”119  Any inference of congressional 
acquiescence that might otherwise arise from the post-Detroit Trust 
reenactments of §§ 2401(a) and 2501 is undermined by this explicit 
non-tax exception.  Since Congress once excepted an area of federal 
claims litigation from the general, six-year limitation without 
gainsaying its application to tax refund litigation, it is increasingly 
difficult to justify Detroit Trust’s implied tax exception. 
The canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius recognizes that 
“[w]here Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a 
general prohibition, additional exceptions are not to be implied, in the 
absence of evidence of a contrary legislative intent.”120  The explicit 
exception in § 2401 for government contracts signals that any other 
congressionally sanctioned exception would also be explicit.  Clearly 
Congress is capable of making its intent clear when it desires 
 
118 The Contract Disputes Act requires a claimant to submit a written claim to the 
contracting officer within six years of the date the claim accrues, 41 U.S.C. 
§ 7103(a)(4)(A), and it contains additional statutes of limitations for appeals to the board 
of contract appeals, id. § 7104(a) (90 days), and to the Court of Federal Claims, id. 
§ 7104(b)(3) (one year). 
119 Contract Disputes Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-563, § 14(b), 92 Stat. 2383, 2389 
(amending 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a)). 
120 Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616–17 (1980); see also United States 
v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 58 (2000) (“When Congress provides exceptions in a statute, it 
does not follow that courts have authority to create others. The proper inference . . . is that 
Congress considered the issue of exceptions and, in the end, limited the statute to the ones 
set forth.”); cf. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (“‘Where Congress 
includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the 
same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the 
disparate inclusion or exclusion.’” (alteration omitted) (quoting United States v. Wong 
Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1972))). 
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exceptions to the six-year limit.121  Congress’s failure to do so in the 
tax context suggests that tax refund suits are governed by the general 
statute of limitations. 
F.  Narrow Construction of Waivers of Sovereign Immunity 
In addition to these textual canons, which suggest that the general 
and tax-specific statutes of limitations both apply to tax refund suits, a 
substantive canon suggests that the resulting dual-limitation 
mechanism makes for good public policy.122  This is the rule that 
“statutes of limitations are construed narrowly against the 
government.”123  Subject-matter-specific substantive canons of this 
sort are particularly influential in the tax context.124  The theory 
behind this pro-government canon is that because a waiver of 
sovereign immunity depends entirely on the grace of the sovereign, a 
statute of limitations, which delimits the scope of that waiver, should 
be construed in the sovereign’s favor.125  Congress is capable of 
 
121 Cf. Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 194 (1996) (“[Section 505(b) of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1991] likewise illustrates Congress’ ability to craft a clear waiver of the Federal 
Government’s sovereign immunity against particular remedies for violations of the Act.  
The clarity of these provisions is in sharp contrast to the waiver Lane seeks to tease out of 
§§ 504 and 505(a)(2) of the Act.”); Clifford F. MacEvoy Co. v. United States, 322 U.S. 
102, 111 & n.12 (1944) (declining to interpret the word “subcontractor” in § 2(a) of the 
Miller Act to include materialmen because “Congress has shown its ability in other 
statutes to make clear an intent to include materialmen within the meaning of the world 
‘subcontractor’”). 
122 The rule that statutes of limitations should be interpreted narrowly against the 
Government is what Eskridge would call a substantive canon because it directly advances 
a preferred policy, but he does not list it in among the substantive canons employed by the 
Rehnquist Court.  See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION 325–28 (1994). 
123 BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Burton, 549 U.S. 84, 95 (2006); see id. at 96 (“This canon is 
rooted in the traditional rule quod nullum tempus occurrit regi—time does not run against 
the King.  A corollary of this rule is that when the sovereign elects to subject itself to a 
statute of limitations, the sovereign is given the benefit of the doubt if the scope of the 
statute is ambiguous.” (citation omitted)). 
124 See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, The Warp and Woof of Statutory 
Interpretation: Comparing Supreme Court Approaches in Tax Law and Workplace Law, 
58 DUKE L.J. 1231, 1269 (“The Justices rely on tax-based canons in almost half the tax 
decisions in which they invoke substantive canons . . . .  The heavy focus on tax-specific 
substantive canons can be seen as a form of expertise borrowing . . . .  The Justices may 
invoke policy norms like construing exceptions against the taxpayer or favoring the IRS’s 
summons power to support if not shape their responses to difficult doctrinal issues of tax 
law.”). 
125 See Daube v. United States, 289 U.S. 367, 372 (1933) (“High public interests make 
it necessary that there be stability and certainty in the revenues of government.  These ends 
are not susceptible of attainment if periods of limitation may be disregarded or 
extended.”). 
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enlarging the scope of its waiver if the courts construe it too narrowly, 
but it is Congress rather than the courts that should take responsibility 
for defining the limits of sovereign immunity.126 
Without the six-year “outside limit,” the Government leaves the 
door open indefinitely to refund suits whenever the IRS fails to 
disallow an administrative claim.  This circumstance occurs more 
often than one might expect because of the permissive, judge-made 
standard for what qualifies as a refund claim.  The Supreme Court 
has often held that a notice fairly advising the Commissioner of the 
nature of the taxpayer’s claim, which the Commissioner could reject 
because too general or because it does not comply with formal 
requirements of the statute and regulations, will nevertheless be 
treated as a claim, where formal defects and lack of specificity have 
been remedied by amendment filed after the lapse of the statutory 
period.127 
Despite Treasury regulations attempting to raise the bar for adequate 
refund claims,128 the Federal Circuit has maintained a liberal standard 
that recognizes a valid, informal refund claim wherever the taxpayer’s 
notice to the IRS includes “a written component” and “adequately 
apprise[s] the [IRS] that a refund is sought and for certain years.”129  
Other circuits have followed suit.130  Under this lax standard, valid 
administrative refund claims have been identified in a request for 
information about a failure-to-file penalty,131 in “various notations 
and figures” on a tax return combined with “knowledge gained by the 
revenue agent in auditing [the taxpayer’s] returns,”132 in a written 
 
126 See, e.g., Webre Steib Co. v. Comm’r, 324 U.S. 164, 176 (1945) (“The cause of 
action here rests on a waiver of the sovereign immunity to suit which Congress may make 
upon such conditions as it chooses.”); Minnesota v. United States, 305 U.S. 382, 388 
(1939) (“[I]t rests with Congress to determine not only whether the United States may be 
sued, but in what courts the suit may be brought.”). 
127 United States v. Kales, 314 U.S. 186, 194 (1941) (citing cases). 
128 See Treas. Reg. § 301.6402-2(b)(1) (1967) (“The claim must set forth in detail each 
ground upon which a credit or refund is claimed and facts sufficient to apprise the 
Commissioner of the exact basis thereof.  The statement of the grounds and facts must be 
verified by a written declaration that it is made under the penalties of perjury.  A claim 
which does not comply with this paragraph will not be considered for any purpose as a 
claim for refund or credit.”). 
129 Computervision Corp. v. United States, 445 F.3d 1355, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2006) 
(quoting Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp. v. United States, 318 F.2d 915, 920 (Ct. 
Cl. 1963)).  The taxpayer’s complaint in Computervision did not qualify as an informal 
refund claim because it was formal and gave the IRS no notice that the taxpayer would 
seek a refund on the interest at issue.  Id. 
130 Id. at 1364 n.9 (citing cases). 
131 W. Co. of N. Am. v. United States, 323 F.3d 1024, 1035 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
132 Am. Radiator, 318 F.2d at 921. 
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protest made before payment of the relevant tax,133 in an objection 
written on the back of a check by which the relevant tax was paid,134 
and even in “oral statements of a taxpayer . . . documented in written 
form by IRS personnel.”135  Because there is often room for doubt 
about whether such documentation adequately apprises the IRS of the 
taxpayer’s claim, the IRS may fail to formally disallow what a court 
later determines to have been an informal refund claim.  In that event, 
the two-year statute of limitations never even starts to run, and the 
taxpayer’s right to sue—unless constrained by the general, six-year 
limitation on claims against the Government—continues 
indefinitely.136 
Indefinite vulnerability to suit is not a reasonable risk to impose on 
the Government in light of the clear “every claim” language of the 
six-year limitation, and it is exactly the sort of risk mitigated by the 
canon favoring narrow construction of statutes of limitations against 
the Government.  Six years after the claim accrues, reliable, new 
evidence is unlikely to come to light.  The prospect of a never-ending 
right to sue risks the loss of relevant evidence by the Government and 
the taxpayer, and it may encourage taxpayers to file ambiguous 
papers with the IRS to be construed years later as informal refund 
claims.  The text of the statutory refund scheme currently in effect 
suggests that Congress has chosen to protect the fisc through two 
concurrent statutes of limitations—one limiting taxpayers to two 
years after administrative disallowance in which to file suit, and the 
other imposing a six-year backstop for claims that the IRS disallows 
late or not at all. 
Requiring suit within six years of the accrual of a tax refund claim 
is not too great a hardship to impose on the taxpayer.  The same 
limitation applies unquestionably to other kinds of claims against the 
Government.137  A far greater hardship is the one the Court imposed 
in United States v. Clintwood Elkhorn Mining Co.—the requirement 
that the taxpayer file a timely administrative tax refund claim even 
 
133 Newton v. United States, 163 F. Supp. 614, 619–20 (Ct. Cl. 1958). 
134 Night Hawk Leasing Co. v. United States, 18 F. Supp. 938, 941–42 (Ct. Cl. 1937). 
135 New Eng. Elec. Sys. v. United States, 32 Fed. Cl. 636, 643 (1995). 
136 See supra notes 10–17 and accompanying text (discussing Edwards v. United States, 
92 Fed. Cl. 277 (2010)); see also 2000 IRS Non Docketed Serv. Advice Rev. 11495, 2000 
WL 34423449 (Aug. 3, 2000) (identifying a taxpayer’s letter as an informal refund claim 
and declaring that “[b]ecause . . . the Service has never issued . . . a notice [of 
disallowance], the limitation period for [the taxpayer’s] filing of a refund suit may never 
expire”). 
137 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 75. 
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before having a good reason to suspect the illegality of the underlying 
tax.138  If the taxpayer can be required to anticipate such tectonic 
shifts as the IRS’s acquiescence in the unconstitutionality of a twenty-
year-old tax, she may also reasonably be required to bring suit within 
six years of filing her administrative claim for refund. 
III 
PARALLEL HISTORIES OF THE GENERAL AND TAX-SPECIFIC 
LIMITATIONS ON CLAIMS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT 
It may be unnecessary to resort to legislative history to prove that 
the general, six-year limit applies to tax refund suits.  Where the 
meaning of a statute is unambiguous, as the scope of “[e]very civil 
action commenced against the United States” seems to be, there is no 
need to look behind the words enacted by Congress.139  But courts 
frequently consult legislative history to confirm what seems clear 
from the text.140  The supposed rule that only 26 U.S.C. § 6532(a) 
applies to tax refund suits despite the plain meaning of 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 2401(a) and 2501, has been built on a misunderstanding of the 
history of those provisions and their predecessors.141  Legislative 
history confirms that Congress never intended the tax-specific 
limitation to eclipse the general, six-year bar.  The extensive parallel 
histories and frequent reenactments of both provisions demonstrate 
that they were designed to complement one another. 
Congress created the Court of Claims in 1855 to “hear and 
determine all claims founded upon any law of Congress, or upon any 
 
138 See 553 U.S. 1, 11–12 (2009); infra Part IV.A.  The coal tax at issue in Clintwood 
Elkhorn was levied in 1978 and held unconstitutional in 1998.  See 553 U.S. at 5. 
139 See Whitfield v. United States, 543 U.S. 209, 215 (2005) (“Because the meaning of 
[18 U.S.C.] § 1956(h)’s text is plain and unambiguous, we need not accept petitioners’ 
invitation to consider the legislative history.”); BedRoc Ltd., LLC v. United States, 541 
U.S. 176, 186 (2004) (“Because we have held that the text of the statutory reservation 
clearly excludes sand and gravel, we have no occasion to resort to legislative history.”). 
140 See CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 382 (1981) (“[T]he legislative history supports 
the plain meaning of the statute.”).  But see Milner v. Dep’t of the Navy, 131 S. Ct. 1259, 
1266 (2011) (“Those of us who make use of legislative history believe that clear evidence 
of congressional intent may illuminate ambiguous text. We will not take the opposite tack 
of allowing ambiguous legislative history to muddy clear statutory language.”); Zedner v. 
United States, 547 U.S. 489, 510–11 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[I]f legislative 
history is relevant when it confirms the plain meaning of the statutory text, it should also 
be relevant when it contradicts the plain meaning, thus rendering what is plain ambiguous.  
Because the use of legislative history is illegitimate and ill advised in the interpretation of 
any statute—and especially a statute that is clear on its face—I do not join this portion of 
the Court’s opinion.”). 
141 See supra Part I. 
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regulation of an executive department, or upon any contract, express 
or implied, with the government of the United States.”142  Initially, 
the Court of Claims merely reported its determination in each case to 
Congress, which could then choose whether to enact the court’s 
determination into law.143  In 1863, Congress gave the Court of 
Claims power to issue final judgments.144  Both the general and tax-
specific limitations on suits against the Government have their origins 
in Congress’s efforts to grant and circumscribe this court’s 
jurisdiction. 
A.  The History of the General, Six-Year Statute of Limitations 
At the same time Congress gave up its supervisory role over the 
Court of Claims, it set the outer boundary on the court’s jurisdiction.  
The 1863 Act provided that “every claim against the United States, 
cognizable by the [C]ourt of [C]laims, shall be forever barred unless 
the petition setting forth a statement of the claim be filed in the court . 
. . within six years after the claim first accrues.”145  Although the 
exact wording of this provision and its place in the U.S. Code has 
changed over time, the six-year bar, measured from accrual, has 
remained constant. 
The Tucker Act of 1887 expanded the jurisdiction of the Court of 
Claims to embrace constitutional claims.146  It rephrased the 
affirmative limit on “every claim against the United States” in the 
negative: “no suit against the Government of the United States[]  shall 
be allowed under this act unless the same shall have been brought 
within six years after the right accrued for which the claim is 
made.”147  This syntactical change clarified that Congress could 
impose narrower limitations on specific classes of claims without 
repealing the general limitation.  As Congressman Tucker’s Report 
from the House Judiciary Committee explained, the purpose of this 
provision was “to leave all claims so barred to the special action of 
 
142 An Act To Establish a Court for the Investigation of Claims Against the United 
States, ch. 122, § 1, 10 Stat. 612, 612, (1855). 
143 10 Stat. 613–14, §§ 7–8. 
144 See An Act To Amend “An Act To Establish a Court for the Investigation of Claims 
Against the United States,” ch. 92, sec. 10, 12 Stat. 765, 767 (1863). 
145 Id. 
146 See An Act To Provide for the Bringing of Suits Against the Government of the 
United States (Tucker Act), ch. 359, § 1, 24 Stat. 505, 505 (1887). 
147 Id. 
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Congress.”148  The next section of that Act—sometimes called the 
“Little Tucker Act” even though it is a part of the same piece of 
legislation—gave the district courts concurrent jurisdiction with the 
Court of Claims for claims up to $1000.149  Thus, the same Act that 
first vested the district courts with jurisdiction over tax refund suits, 
among other claims against the Government, also imposed—in the 
immediately preceding section—a six-year limitation on all such 
claims. 
The Tucker Act’s “no suit” limitation made its way into the 
Judicial Code in 1911.150  By 1948, though, Congress had completely 
reverted to the “every claim” and “every civil action” construction 
found in current §§ 2501 and 2401(a).151  There the six-year 
limitation has remained to this day, but it has not been neglected: A 
provision for referral of claims to the Court of Claims from Congress 
and the executive departments was deleted in 1954;152 the exception 
for contract claims was added in 1978;153 and § 2501 underwent 
minor revisions to recognize the renaming of the Court of Claims as 
 
148 H.R. REP. NO. 49-1077, at 4 (1886). 
149 Tucker Act § 2, 24 Stat. at 505.  The cap on district court jurisdiction over claims 
against the Government was eventually increased to $10,000 and eliminated altogether for 
tax refund actions.  See An Act To Permit All Civil Actions Against the United States for 
Recovery of Taxes Erroneously or Illegally Assessed or Collected To Be Brought in the 
District Court with Right to Trial by Jury, Pub. L. No. 83-559, 68 Stat. 589, 589 (1954) 
(amending 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)).  The concurrent tax refund jurisdiction of the district 
courts and the Court of Federal Claims continues to the present day.  See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1346(a)(1).  More tax cases are decided in the district courts than in the Court of Federal 
Claims.  See Thomas D. Greenaway, Choice of Forum in Federal Civil Tax Litigation, 62 
TAX LAW. 311, 316 & n.24 (2009). 
150 An Act To Codify, Revise, and Amend the Laws Relating to the Judiciary, ch. 231, 
sec. 24(20), 36 Stat. 1087, 1093 (1911) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 41(20)).  But see id. § 156, 
36 Stat. 1139 (“Every claim against the United States cognizable by the Court of Claims, 
shall be forever barred unless the petition setting forth a statement thereof is filed in the 
court . . . within six years after the claim first accrues.”). 
151 An Act To Revise, Codify, and Enact into Law Title 28 of the United States Code 
entitled “Judicial Code and Judiciary,” ch. 157, § 2401(a), 62 Stat. 869, 971 (1948) 
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a)) (“Every civil action commenced against the United 
States shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within six years after the right of action 
first accrues.”); 62 Stat. 976 (1948) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2501) (“Every claim of which 
the Court of Claims has jurisdiction shall be barred unless the petition thereon is filed . . . 
within six years after such claim first accrues.”). 
152 An Act To Amend Various Statutes and Certain Titles of the United States Code, for 
the Purpose of Correcting Obsolete References, and for Other Purposes, ch. 1263, sec. 52, 
68 Stat. 1226, 1246 (1954) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 2501). 
153 Contract Disputes Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-563, 92 Stat. 2383, 2389 (amending 
28 U.S.C. § 2401(a)); see supra Part II.E. 
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the “United States Claims Court” in 1982154 and the “United States 
Court of Federal Claims” in 1992.155  Despite many opportunities to 
do so, Congress never codified a tax exception into the six-year limit 
on every claim against the Government. 
B.  The History of the Tax-Specific Statute of Limitations 
In theory, the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims extended to tax 
refund claims ever since the court’s creation in 1855, because such 
claims are “founded upon any law of Congress.”156  Until 1861, 
however, there was no federal income tax, so there was none to be 
refunded.157  By the time Congress instituted the six-year bar, though, 
the Court of Claims had already decided import duty refund claims158 
and a manufacturing tax refund claim that arguably sounded in 
contract.159 
In 1866, just three years after imposing the six-year bar on “every 
claim against the United States,”160 Congress placed an even more 
restrictive limitation on a subset of those actions—claims for refund 
of taxes wrongly collected.161  Starting in 1866, tax refund suits could 
be brought only within six months after the commissioner of internal 
revenue denied an administrative claim or—if the commissioner 
failed to act within six months—within a year of filing the 
 
154 Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 139, 96 Stat. 25, 42 
(amending 28 U.S.C. § 2501). 
155 Court of Federal Claims Technical and Procedural Improvements Act of 1992, Pub. 
L. No. 102-572, § 902(a), 106 Stat. 4516, 4516 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 2501). 
156 An Act To Establish a Court for the Investigation of Claims Against the United 
States, ch. 122, § 1, 10 Stat. 612, 612 (1855). 
157 Cf. Revenue Act of 1861, ch. 45, § 49, 12 Stat. 292, 309. 
158 See Sturges, Bennet & Co. v. United States, 2 U.S. Cong. Rep. C.C. 35, 46–47, 1856 
U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 56, at *5 (July 28, 1856). 
159 Compare Adams’s Case, 1 Ct. Cl. 192, 195 (1865) (holding the Government liable 
for a tax collected from the seller, that had been assessed on manufactured goods the 
Government had contracted to purchase, because “the assessment and collection of the tax 
upon the articles delivered under the contract was not authorized by law”), with Adams’s 
Case, 1 Ct. Cl. 306, 306 (1865) (“Having paid [the illegal tax] himself, [the petitioner] was 
entitled to be paid that much more for the goods—to have the sum added to the contract 
price.”).  The distinction between tax refund claims and contract claims was 
inconsequential because, at the time, all were subject to the six-year bar and to no other 
limitation. 
160 An Act To Amend “An Act To Establish a Court for the Investigation of Claims 
Against the United States,” ch. 92, sec. 10, 12 Stat. 765, 767 (1863) (codified at R.S. § 
1069). 
161 An Act To Reduce Internal Taxation and To Amend an Act Entitled “An Act To 
Provide Internal Revenue To Support the Government, To Pay Interest on the Public Debt, 
and for Other Purposes,” ch. 184, sec. 19, 14 Stat. 98, 152 (1866). 
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administrative claim.162  This tax-specific, six-month limitation 
inevitably expired before the general, six-year limitation because both 
measured from the same starting point—accrual.  If the tax refund 
cause of action had lacked its own statute of limitations, or if its only 
trigger had been the Commissioner’s denial rather than accrual, there 
is no reason to believe the six-year limit would not have applied to 
bar untimely tax refund suits. 
The time limit (or limits) applicable to tax refund claims evolved 
dramatically over the next several decades.  In 1872, Congress 
lengthened the six-month limitation to two years after accrual, that is, 
the earlier of two and a half years after filing an administrative claim 
or two years after the denial of that claim.163  This amendment did not 
implicate the general, six-year limitation because, as before, the tax-
specific limitation necessarily operated first. 
In 1921, a decade after the codification of the Tucker Act’s six-
year bar in the Judicial Code, Congress replaced the two-year, post-
accrual limitation on tax refund claims with a five-year post-payment 
limitation.164  Because payment of a tax necessarily precedes accrual 
of a tax refund claim, the tax-specific limitation still was, by 
definition, shorter than the general six-year limitation.  The Senate 
Finance Committee Report indicated that the amended provision 
would “remove[] the ambiguity and doubts surrounding section 3227 
 
162 Id.  (“[N]o suit shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any tax alleged 
to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, until appeal shall have been 
duly made to the commissioner of internal revenue according to the provisions of law in 
that regard, and the regulations of the Secretary of the Treasury established in pursuance 
thereof, and a decision of said commissioner shall be had thereon, unless such suit shall be 
brought within six months from the time of said decision, or within six months from the 
time this act takes effect: Provided, That if said decision shall be delayed more than six 
months from the date of such appeal, then said suit may be brought at any time within 
twelve months from the date of such appeal.”). 
163 An Act To Reduce Duties on Imports, and to Reduce Internal Taxes, and for Other 
Purposes, ch. 315, § 44, 17 Stat. 230, 257–58 (1872) (“[A]ll suits and proceedings for the 
recovery of any internal tax alleged to have been erroneously assessed or collected . . . 
shall be brought within two years next after the cause of action accrued and not after.”) 
(codified without material change at R.S. § 3227 (1878) (“No suit or proceeding for the 
recovery of an internal tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or 
collected . . . shall be maintained in any court, unless the same is brought within two years 
next after the cause of action accrued.”)). 
164 Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 1318, 42 Stat. 227, 315 (codified at R.S. § 3226) 
(“No such suit or proceeding shall be begun before the expiration of six months from the 
date of filing such claim unless the Commissioner renders a decision thereon within that 
time, nor after the expiration of five years from the date of the payment of such tax, 
penalty, or sum.”); id. § 1319 (repealing R.S. § 3227). 
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of the Revised Statutes,”165 whose two-year limitation started running 
when a claim accrued.  The perceived problem with accrual as a 
measuring point was that, at the time, claims accrued upon 
disallowance rather than the mailing of notice.  Taxpayers had no way 
of ascertaining when the IRS disallowed their claims and, therefore, 
no way of knowing when their claims accrued.  Of course, an 
informed taxpayer would have known that her claim could accrue no 
later than six months after payment of the tax, but such guesswork 
effectively shortened the two-year window to eighteen months.  The 
Finance Committee concluded that by “mak[ing] the limitations 
depend upon the filing of a claim for refund rather than on the 
payment of the tax,” former § 3227 did “not provide a definite 
time.”166  By contrast, the new five-year limitation was measured 
from an event within the taxpayer’s knowledge and control—the date 
she paid the tax. 
Congress complicated matters in 1923 when it created an exception 
to the five-year, tax-specific limitation.  The new exception allowed a 
taxpayer to file suit within two years after disallowance, even if more 
than five years had elapsed since she paid the tax.167  As the Senate 
Finance Committee described it, the amended provision would 
“permit bringing suits within two years after the disallowance of a 
claim, the [five-year] statute of limitations notwithstanding.”168  
Thus, Congress reintroduced the kind of ambiguity and doubt it had 
sought to eliminate just two years earlier.  Moreover, the disallowance 
trigger introduced a new complexity that the accrual trigger had 
avoided: for the first time, the tax-specific limitation could conflict 
with the six-year limitation.  Imagine that a taxpayer filed an 
administrative refund claim on the same day she paid her tax.  If the 
IRS disallowed that claim within the last six months of the five-year, 
post-payment window, then the two-year, post-disallowance period 
would, if fully enforced, extend beyond the Tucker Act’s post-
accrual, six-year limit.  And by the amended terms of 26 U.S.C. 
§ 3226, the two-year window could spring into existence even after 
the expiration of the five-year limitation. 
 
165 S. REP. NO. 67-275, at 21 (1921). 
166 Id. at 32. 
167 An Act To Amend the Revenue Act of 1921 in Respect to Credits and Refunds, ch. 
276, sec. 2, 42 Stat. 1504, 1505 (1923) (appending to R.S. § 3226 the phrase “unless such 
suit or proceeding is begun within two years after the disallowance of the part of such 
claim to which such suit or proceeding relates”). 
168 S. REP. NO. 67-1137, at 8 (1923); see supra notes 51–52 and accompanying text. 
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Nothing in the text of the 1923 amendment suggests Congress 
intended to repeal the Tucker Act’s general limitation as applied to 
tax refund claims.  Both limitation schemes were compatible. 
Allowing for the operation of the six-year bar, the new two-year, 
post-disallowance window was no empty letter.  Because an 
administrative claim could be filed up to four years after payment,169 
the Tucker Act’s six-year, post-accrual bar could operate as late as 
five and a half years after the five-year post-payment limitation.  The 
new two-year, post-disallowance window allowed a taxpayer to make 
use of that extra time if her claim was disallowed toward the end of—
or even after—the five-year period. 
One statement in the legislative history of the 1923 amendment can 
be read to support the view that the two additive limitation periods of 
§ 3226 were the only limitations on tax refund suits.  The Senate 
Finance Committee Report reprinted a memorandum from Arnold L. 
Guesmer, chairman of the tax committee of the Inland Press 
Association, who opined that “[t]he law ought not to put the taxpayer 
in the position wherein he must sue the Government before the 
Revenue Bureau has acted on his claim for refund.”170  Mr. 
Guesmer’s statement, which was included for its explanation of an 
unrelated provision of the 1921 Act,171 proves, at most, that he 
personally believed the Tucker Act’s six-year bar ought to be 
inapplicable to tax refund claims or, more likely, that he suffered 
from tax myopia and was unfamiliar with the general limitation on 
claims against the Government.  Congress gave no indication in the 
1921 Act that the six-year bar should not apply to tax refund actions 
like any other claim against the Government. 
This five-year-plus-two-year scheme for tax refund suits remained 
in place for almost a decade, as it was reenacted in the Revenue Acts 
of 1924172 and 1926.173 
 
169 Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 1316, 42 Stat. 227, 314 (codified at R.S. § 3228). 
170 S. REP. NO. 67-1137, at 3, 5. 
171 See id. at 3. 
172 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 1014(a), R.S. § 3226, 43 Stat. 253, 343 (codified at 
26 U.S.C. § 156) (“No such suit or proceeding shall be begun before the expiration of six 
months from the date of filing such claim unless the Commissioner renders a decision 
thereon within that time, nor after the expiration of five years from the date of the payment 
of such tax, penalty, or sum, unless such suit or proceeding is begun within two years after 
the disallowance of the part of such claim to which such suit or proceeding relates.”). 
173 Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 1113(a), 44 Stat. 9, 116 (reenacting without change 
R.S. § 3226). 
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In 1932, Congress eliminated the five-year, post-payment 
limitation, and substituted the mailing of a notice of disallowance—
instead of mere disallowance—as the new trigger for the two-year 
limitation.  Thus, the tax-specific statute of limitations assumed the 
two-year, post-notice form currently found in 26 U.S.C. § 6532(a).174  
The Senate Finance Committee noted that 
[u]nder the [prior] law, the exact date of disallowance is sometimes 
difficult of ascertainment with the consequent uncertainty in such 
cases as to when the statute of limitations on suits begins to run.  
Moreover, the use of the two periods (five years and two years) 
which run from the happening of different events tends to 
confusion.175 
Unlike the straightforward operation of the Tucker Act’s six-year, 
post-accrual limit on tax refund claims, the tax-specific, dual-
limitation scheme established in 1921 really had been confusing.  The 
two-year limit had been triggered by disallowance, whether or not the 
IRS sent the taxpayer notice that her claim had been disallowed.  The 
1932 Act eliminated this confusion by making the two-year limitation 
period start at “the date of mailing by registered mail . . . of a notice 
of the disallowance.”176  It did not purport to nullify the general 
limitation on claims against the Government. 
The Committee also opined that “the best interests of all parties 
concerned will be served by an amendment which makes the date of 
disallowance of the claim absolutely certain in every case and which 
specifies but one limitation period after that date.”177  Taken out of 
context, the reference to “one limitation period” might suggest that 
the Committee understood the amendment to exempt tax refund 
claims from the Tucker Act’s six-year bar.  In context, though, it is 
clear that the Committee had no such intention.  Although the 
amendment specified a single, tax-specific limitation, the Committee 
Report makes no comment on the applicability of a general limitation 
outside the Revenue Act of 1932. 
 
174 Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, § 1103(a), 47 Stat. 169, 286, (codified at R.S. § 3226) 
(“No such suit or proceeding shall be begun before the expiration of six months from the 
date of filing such claim unless the Commissioner renders a decision thereon within that 
time, nor after the expiration of two years from the date of mailing by registered mail by 
the Commissioner to the taxpayer of a notice of the disallowance of the part of the claim to 
which such suit or proceeding relates.”) (recodified at Internal Revenue Code of 1939, ch. 
37, § 3772, 53 Stat. 1, 465). 
175 S. REP. NO. 72-665, at 57 (1932). 
176 Revenue Act of 1932 § 1103(a), 47 Stat. at 286. 
177 Id. 
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At a Senate hearing on the 1932 Act, Hugh Satterlee of the New 
York City Bar Association’s Tax Committee made statements tending 
to support the view that tax refund claims are not subject to the 
general limitation on claims against the Government.178  Mr. 
Satterlee’s written submission, which was entered into the record, 
expressed the belief that “[i]n all fairness the taxpayer should be 
entitled to begin suit at any time after the expiration of six months 
from the date of filing his claim and before two years after the 
commissioner shall have sent notice of the disallowance of his 
claim.”179  If Mr. Satterlee’s idea of fairness were the law, the sun 
would never set on a tax refund claim that the IRS fails to disallow.  
Fair or not, this result is contrary to the six-year bar, which he did not 
discuss.  As Mr. Satterlee recommended, Congress made the two-year 
period for filing suit commence upon the mailing of a notice of 
disallowance, but Congress did not enact the notion that this is the 
exclusive limitation on tax refund suits. 
The tax-specific statute of limitations has remained substantially 
the same since 1932.180  It was recodified as § 3772(a)(2) of the first 
Internal Revenue Code in 1939,181 and recodified again with minor 
changes as § 6532(a)(1) in 1954.182  The 1954 Code included a cross-
reference that might incorrectly be read to support the Detroit Trust 
rule.  It referred to the five-year limitation of 28 U.S.C. § 2462 as the 
“period of limitations in respect of civil actions for fines, penalties, 
 
178 Revenue Act of 1932: Hearing on H.R. 10,236 Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 72d 
Cong. 1388 (1932) (statement of Hugh Satterlee, Chairman, N.Y City Bar Ass’n Comm. 
on Taxation) (“[T]he chief amendment we suggest to [§ 3226] is an amendment to the 
effect that the statute should run only from the time of notification of disallowance of his 
claim, instead of the date of rejection of the claim for refund.”). 
179 Id. at 1396. 
180 Compare I.R.C. § 6532(a)(1) (1980), with Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, tit. 9, 
§ 1103, 47 Stat. 169, 286; supra note 174. 
181 Internal Revenue Code of 1939, ch. 37, § 3772(a)(2), 53 Stat. 1, 465 (“No such suit 
or proceeding shall be begun before the expiration of six months from the date of filing 
such claim unless the Commissioner renders a decision thereon within that time, nor after 
the expiration of two years from the date of mailing by registered mail by the 
Commissioner to the taxpayer of a notice of the disallowance of the part of the claim to 
which such suit or proceeding relates.”). 
182 Internal Revenue Code of 1954, ch. 66, subch. D, § 6532(a)(1), 68A Stat. 3, 816  
(codified at I.R.C. § 6532(a)(1)) (“No suit or proceeding under section 7422(a) for the 
recovery of any internal revenue tax, penalty, or other sum, shall be begun before the 
expiration of 6 months from the date of filing the claim required under such section unless 
the Secretary or his delegate renders a decision thereon within that time, nor after the 
expiration of 2 years from the date of mailing by registered mail by the Secretary or his 
delegate to the taxpayer of a notice of the disallowance of the part of the claim to which 
the suit or proceeding relates.”). 
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and forfeitures,” without mentioning the general, six-year statute of 
limitations in the same title.183  It is not irrational, however, to 
reference a narrower, context-specific limitation but not the generally 
applicable limitation that serves as an outside limit on all claims 
against the Government.  Moreover, whatever interpretive value this 
cross-reference might otherwise have is negated by I.R.C. § 7806(a), 
which provides that “[t]he cross references in this title to other 
portions of the title . . . are made only for convenience, and shall be 
given no legal effect.”184 
Despite numerous reenactments of § 6532(a)(1),185 Congress has 
never expressed the intent, ascribed to it by Detroit Trust, to trump 
the general six-year limit on claims against the Government. 
C.  The History of the Extension Provision 
A possible argument in favor of the Detroit Trust rule, never 
discussed by any court, could be based on a provision found in neither 
statute of limitations.  A separate provision allows the IRS and the 
taxpayer to extend the period for filing a tax refund suit.  Today the 
extension provision appears in the paragraph immediately following 
the tax-specific statute of limitations that it modifies.  It provides that 
 
183 Id. § 6533 (codified at I.R.C. § 6533(1)). 
184 I.R.C. § 7806(a) (1954).  Even if the cross-reference were a legitimate aid to 
interpretation, it would be difficult to argue with any specificity that it signaled an implied 
repeal of the six-year bar.  The insertion of the cross-reference in 1954 bears no relation in 
time to any of the statutory amendments by which the six-year bar might arguably have 
been implicitly amended.  If the 1954 Congress believed that the 1866 Congress had 
amended the six-year bar when it enacted the first tax-specific statute of limitations (a 
proposition for which there is no evidence), that 1954 belief could not have changed the 
effect of the 1866 enactment.  Similarly, the 1954 cross-reference came too late to define 
the effect of the 1928 amendment that first permitted extensions of the period for filing 
suit.  See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 530 n.27 (2007) (“[T]he views of a 
subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one.” 
(quoting United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960))); id. (“[P]ost-enactment 
legislative history is not only oxymoronic but inherently entitled to little weight.” (quoting 
Cobell v. Norton, 428 F.3d 1070, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 2005))). 
185 See Technical Amendments Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 35-366, § 89(b), 72 Stat. 1606, 
1666 (replacing “registered mail” with “certified mail or registered mail”); Federal Tax 
Lien Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-719, § 110(b), 80 Stat. 1125, 1144 (adding subsection 
(c), which imposes more restrictive time limits on suits by third parties claiming an interest 
in property the IRS has levied); Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 
§ 1906(b)(13), 90 Stat. 1520, 1834 (replacing “Secretary or his delegate” with 
“Secretary”); Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-589, § 6(d)(4), 94 Stat. 3389, 3408 
(adding a cross-reference to 11 U.S.C. § 505(a)(2), allowing a bankruptcy court to 
determine an estate’s entitlement to a tax refund 120 days after the trustee requests a 
refund or after a determination is made on that request). 
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“[t]he 2-year period prescribed in paragraph (1) shall be extended for 
such period as may be agreed upon in writing between the taxpayer 
and the Secretary.”186  The provision does not expressly limit the 
length or number of permissible extensions, and the applicable 
regulations impose no such limit.187 
One might argue—although no court has held—that Congress’s 
failure to impose on permissible extensions an explicit limit to 
correspond with the six-year jurisdictional bar of 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 2401(a) and 2501 demonstrates Congress’s intent to exempt all tax 
refund suits from that general limitation.  Section 6532 contains no 
affirmative evidence that Congress intended the parties to be able to 
extend the tax-specific limitation indefinitely, but the provision puts 
no limit on the extensions that can be agreed to, and it was 
undoubtedly foreseeable that parties would have occasion to agree to 
lengthy extensions of the two-year limit.  The circumstances that 
make an extension mutually beneficial to the IRS and the taxpayer, 
such as a pending test case or complicated settlement negotiations, 
often last for years.188  Although these factors can be fairly argued to 
suggest that Congress anticipated the parties would agree to 
extensions beyond the six-year bar and that it implicitly approved 
such extensions, there is no indication that Congress intended to 
repeal that bar entirely in the tax context.  An agreement pursuant to 
§ 6532(a)(2) may allow suit more than six years after the underlying 
claim accrues, but it does not follow that refund suits escape the six-
year bar altogether, even in the absence of agreements to extend the 
statute.  The history of the extension provision lends no support to the 
Detroit Trust rule, because it is silent as to the provision’s effect on 
the six-year bar. 
The first version of the extension provision was adopted as 
§ 608(b)(2) of the Revenue Act of 1928.  It permitted tolling of “the 
 
186 I.R.C. § 6532(a)(2). 
187 See Treas. Reg. § 301.6532-1(b); see also IRM 8.7.7.2.3(2) (Oct. 26, 2007) (“The 
taxpayer may file for extension on Form 907, Agreement to Extend the Time to Bring Suit, 
as long as the taxpayer and the Service execute Form 907 before the 2-year period 
expires.”), available at http://www.irs.gov/irm/part8/irm_08-007-007.html#d0e59; id. pt. 
8.7.7.2.3(3) (Oct. 26, 2007) (“Multiple Form 907’s may be executed by the Service and 
the taxpayer to extend the period to file a refund suit under IRC 6532(a)(2) as long as each 
extension is executed before the period previously agreed upon has expired.”); I.R.S. Form 
907, “Agreement to Extend the Time to Bring Suit” (Rev. 1-2001) (specifying no 
limitation on the expiration date of the extension). 
188 See IRM 4.24.8.12.4(1) (Aug. 13, 2008) (indicating that a Form 907 Agreement 
should be used when an excise tax refund claim that is expected to settle may be “delayed 
for years”), available at http://www.irs.gov/irm/part4/irm_04-024-008.html#d0e963. 
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statute of limitations for filing suit” until the issuance of a decision in 
a case pending at the time of the agreement.189  The statute did not 
say whether it applied only to the tax-specific, five-plus-two-year 
statute of limitations then in effect or also to the general, six-year bar.  
The Senate Finance Committee explained that the extension provision 
was designed to reduce redundant litigation by allowing taxpayers 
with related legal theories to await the resolution of a test case before 
having to file suit.190 
In response to a question that had arisen “as to whether [the 
extension] agreement extends the period for filing suit in case the 
Commissioner refuses to allow the refund,”191  Congress clarified, in 
1934, that an extension agreement enlarged the period for filing 
suit—not just the period in which the IRS could grant a refund.192 
The extension provision took its current form in 1954 as the second 
paragraph of § 6532(a).193  For the first time, the extension provision 
specified that it applied to the tax-specific, two-year limitation of 
§ 6532(a)(1).  The House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate 
Finance Committee both noted that the new provision allowing 
extension of the statute of limitations “for such period as may be 
agreed upon” was more flexible than its prior iteration, which 
 
189 Specifically, the first extension provision decreed that a tax refund “shall be 
considered erroneous . . . if the refund was made after the expiration of the period of 
limitation for filing suit, unless—(1) within such period suit was begun by the taxpayer, or 
(2) within such period, the taxpayer and the Commissioner agreed in writing to suspend 
the running of the statute of limitations for filing suit from the date of the agreement to the 
date of final decision in one or more named cases then pending before the United States 
Board of Tax Appeals or the courts.”  Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 608, 45 Stat. 791, 
874. 
190 S. REP. NO. 70-960, at 42 (1928) (“It seems desirable to provide some means 
whereby, in connection with questions of broad application to a great number of cases, one 
test suit may be brought and all the other cases involving the same point may be held in 
abeyance until the test suit is decided. . . . [The Senate’s] amendment will prevent a 
multiplicity of suits without disturbing in any way the desirable policy embodied in the 
provisions of the House bill,” which provided only that refunds issued after the expiration 
of the statute of limitations were erroneous.). 
191 H.R. REP. NO. 73-704, at 37 (1934). 
192 Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 503, 48 Stat. 680, 756 (amending Revenue Act of 
1928, ch. 852, § 608(b)(2), 45 Stat. 791, 874, by adding, “If such agreement has been 
entered into, the running of such statute of limitations shall be suspended in accordance 
with the terms of the agreement”) (codified at Internal Revenue Code of 1939, ch. 37, 
§ 3774, 53 Stat. 1, 466). 
193 Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, § 6532(a)(2), 68A Stat. 3, 816 
(“The 2-year period prescribed in paragraph (1) shall be extended for such period as may 
be agreed upon in writing between the taxpayer and the Secretary or his delegate.”). 
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required that the end point of the extension be “the date of final 
decision in one or more named cases then pending.”194 
This history provides no basis for Detroit Trust’s view that the tax-
specific limitation nullifies the six-year bar for all purposes in the tax 
context.  Congress gave no indication that it intended such a broad 
repeal of the general limitation, and that result should not be 
presumed unnecessarily.195  Any implicit amendment of 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 2401(a) and 2501 by § 6532(a)(2) must be construed as narrowly 
as is feasible, in light of the rule that waivers of sovereign immunity 
are to be read in favor of the government.196  The best interpretation 
of § 6532(a)(2) is the one that gives maximum effect to both the 
extension provision and the six-year bar.197  Thus § 6532(a) trumps 
the six-year bar only where the parties agree to extend the two-year 
deadline more than six years after accrual.  In other words, the six-
year bar places an outside limit on tax refund suits unless the parties 
execute an agreement pursuant to § 6532(a)(2) that suspends the two-
year statute of limitations beyond that period. In the absence of such 
an agreement, nothing prevents the operation of the six-year bar 
according to its own terms.  This harmonization of § 6532(a) with the 
general limitation does less violence to the plain meaning of “every 
civil action” than the Detroit Trust rule does, and it avoids the 
problematic results of that rule.  Because the IRS’s written consent is 
necessary for an extension agreement under § 6532(a)(2), this narrow 
exception to the six-year bar does not risk leaving the Government 
perpetually vulnerable to suit as the Detroit Trust rule does whenever 
the IRS fails to mail a notice of disallowance.  This interpretation—
holding that an agreement to extend the tax-specific limitation also 
extends the general limitation—assures that the extension provision 
has its intended effect and is not frustrated by the six-year bar. 
IV 
RECENT CASES UNDERMINING THE DETROIT TRUST RULE 
In addition to the general skepticism the Supreme Court exhibited 
toward tax exceptionalism in Mayo Foundation for Medical 
Education & Research v. United States,198 other tax cases interpreting 
 
194 H.R. REP. NO. 83-1337, app. at 417 (1954); S. REP. NO. 83-1622, at 588 (1954). 
195 See supra Part II.C (discussing the presumption against implied repeal). 
196 See supra Part II.F (discussing the rule favoring narrow construction of waivers of 
sovereign immunity). 
197 See supra Part II.D (discussing the in pari materia canon). 
198 131 S. Ct. 704, 713–14 (2011); see supra notes 1–6 and accompanying text. 
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the general limitation on suits against the Government indicate that 
Detroit Trust’s tax exception to the six-year bar is nearing its end. 
A.  United States v. Clintwood Elkhorn 
In United States v. Clintwood Elkhorn Mining Co., a unanimous 
Supreme Court enforced the shorter of two parallel limitation periods 
to hold that a tax refund claim was time-barred even though the 
underlying tax had been held unconstitutional.199  The Court held that 
the statutory refund scheme barred a suit by three coal companies for 
recovery of money collected pursuant to a tax “on coal from mines 
located in the United States sold by the producer.”200  That tax 
previously had been held to violate the Export Clause of the 
Constitution in Ranger Fuel Corp. v. United States,201 a district court 
decision that the Government did not appeal, and in which the IRS 
acquiesced.202  The coal companies successfully filed administrative 
claims for refund of the taxes paid in 1997, 1998, and 1999 but not 
earlier years, because the three-year statute of limitations on filing 
administrative refund claims, I.R.C. § 6511, had expired.  Under 
§ 6511, an administrative claim must be filed within three years of 
filing a return or within two years of paying a tax.  Instead of filing a 
time-barred administrative claim for refund—the prerequisite to suit 
under I.R.C. § 7422(a)—the companies sued the Government directly 
under the Tucker Act for a refund of the unconstitutional taxes paid in 
the years 1994 through 1996, on the theory that unconstitutional taxes 
are not taxes at all and therefore not limited by the three-year statute 
of limitations in § 6511 but only by the six-year statute of limitations 
in the Tucker Act itself.203  The Court of Federal Claims allowed the 
suit to proceed,204 and the Federal Circuit affirmed205 on the basis of 
its decision in Cyprus Amax Coal Co. v. United States that companies 
could sue for refunds of unconstitutional taxes directly under the 
Tucker Act.206 
 
199 553 U.S. 1, 8–9 (2008). 
200 Id. at 5 (quoting I.R.C. § 4121(a)(1)). 
201 33 F. Supp. 2d 466, 469 (1998). 
202 See I.R.S. Notice 2000-28, 2000-1 C.B. 1116, 1116–17. 
203 See 28 U.S.C. § 2501. 
204 Andalex Res., Inc. v. United States, 54 Fed. Cl. 563, 564 (2002). 
205 Clintwood Elkhorn Mining Co. v. United States, 473 F.3d 1373, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 
2007).  The Court of Appeals went even further than the Court of Federal Claims, holding 
not only that the companies could pursue their claim under the Export Clause, but also that 
they could recover interest on the unconstitutionally imposed taxes.  Id. at 1374–75. 
206 205 F.3d 1369, 1376 (2000). 
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The Supreme Court reversed, holding that “the plain language of 
26 U.S.C. §§ 7422(a) and 6511 requires a taxpayer seeking a refund 
for a tax assessed in violation of the Export Clause, just as for any 
other unlawfully assessed tax, to file a timely administrative refund 
claim before bringing suit against the Government.”207  The Court 
reasoned that the Tucker Act’s six-year statute provides an “outside 
limit” on the I.R.C.’s statute of limitations—not an alternative 
procedure for the recovery of unconstitutional taxes.208 
In enforcing the more restrictive of the two limitations, while 
acknowledging the six-year “outside limit,” the Clintwood Elkhorn 
Court followed many of the canons of statutory construction 
discussed above.  The Court’s repeated application of the plain 
meaning rule to § 7422(a)’s requirement of an administrative claim 
before filing suit in “any court for the recovery of any internal 
revenue tax” and § 6511’s limitation on claims for refunds of “any 
tax” provides a good model for enforcing the plain meaning of the 
six-year limitation on “every claim.”209  Although not invoking the in 
pari materia canon explicitly, the Court followed the logic of that 
interpretive principle, reading both statutes of limitations together and 
interpreting them so as to give a plausible meaning to each.  The 
Court resisted the taxpayers’ expansive reading of the Tucker Act 
(with its six-year limitation period) because, in the case before it, to 
do so would have rendered the Internal Revenue Code’s refund 
scheme (with its requirement of an administrative claim prior to filing 
suit and its three-year limitation period on administrative claims) of 
 
207 United States v. Clintwood Elkhorn Mining Co., 553 U.S. 1, 14 (2008). 
208 Id. at 8 (quoting United States v. A.S. Kreider Co., 313 U.S. 443, 447 (1941)).  The 
Federal Circuit has cited Clintwood Elkhorn for the proposition that “the more specific 
limit prevails.”  Bormes v. United States, 626 F.3d 574, 583 (Fed. Cir. 2010).  More 
accurately, Clintwood Elkhorn stands for the proposition that when two relevant statutes of 
limitations are compatible, both apply—the longer, more general statute remaining in force 
as an “outside limit” on the shorter, context-specific statute.  553 U.S. at 8–9. 
209 See Clintwood Elkhorn, 553 U.S. at 7-8 (“Five ‘any’s’ in one sentence and it begins 
to seem that Congress meant [§ 7422(a)] to have expansive reach. . . .  Again, this 
language [in § 6511] on its face plainly covers the companies’ claim for a ‘refund’ of 
‘tax[es] imposed . . . .’”); id. at 11 (“‘[T]he strong presumption that the plain language of 
the statute expresses congressional intent is rebutted only in rare and exceptional 
circumstances.’ . . .  [T]he language of the relevant statutes emphatically covers the facts 
of this case.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129, 
135 (1991))); id. at 14 (“We therefore hold that the plain language of 26 U.S.C. §§ 7422(a) 
and 6511 requires a taxpayer seeking a refund for a tax assessed in violation of the Export 
Clause, just as for any other unlawfully assessed tax, to file a timely administrative refund 
claim before bringing suit against the Government.”). 
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“no meaning whatever.”210  The rule that statutes of limitations 
should be construed narrowly against the Government also favored 
the result in Clintwood Elkhorn (enforcing the I.R.C.’s shorter statute 
of limitations because it is more protective of the Government than 
the general limitation), though like the in pari materia canon, it is 
only implied.  As the Court recognized, “[I]t is certainly within 
Congress’s authority to assure that allegations of taxes unlawfully 
assessed . . . are processed in an orderly and timely manner, and that 
costly litigation is avoided when possible.”211 
If the reasoning of Clintwood Elkhorn is followed to its logical 
conclusion, both statutes of limitations—the tax-specific, two-year, 
post-disallowance limitation and the general, six-year, post-accrual 
limitation—will operate together.  The taxpayers in Clintwood 
Elkhorn lost because they satisfied the Tucker Act’s statute of 
limitations but not the I.R.C.’s.  If the Court’s reasoning holds true, a 
taxpayer should also lose if she satisfies the I.R.C.’s statute of 
limitations but files suit more than six years after her claim accrues.  
In Clintwood Elkhorn, the Supreme Court rejected the taxpayers’ 
interpretation of the six-year bar as the only applicable statute of 
limitations for suits to recover unconstitutional taxes because that 
interpretation would have left the I.R.C.’s refund scheme with “no 
meaning whatever.”212  But the Detroit Trust theory of tax refund 
jurisdiction makes an equal and opposite error.  By holding that the 
tax-specific timing requirements are the only such limits applicable to 
a tax refund suit, the Court of Claims rendered the six-year bar void 
as to tax refund litigation.  Applying the in pari materia reasoning of 
Clintwood Elkhorn, a court should read two such related statutes of 
limitations together so as to give meaning to each.  Thus, the general 
statute of limitations must function as an “outside limit” on tax refund 
litigation just as the Clintwood Elkhorn Court said it does.213 
 
210 Clintwood Elkhorn, 553 U.S. at 9 (quoting Kreider, 313 U.S. at 448); see also id. at 
5 (“Read together, the import of [26 U.S.C. §§ 7422 and 6511] is clear: unless a claim for 
refund of a tax has been filed within the time limits imposed by § 6511(a), a suit for refund 
. . . may not be maintained in any court.” (quoting United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 
602 (1990))). 
211 Id. at 12. 
212 Id. at 9. 
213 Id. at 8. 
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B.  Wagenet v. United States 
In 2009, the Central District of California expressly held that 
Detroit Trust was “wrongly decided,” and enforced the six-year 
limitation to dismiss a tax refund suit as untimely.  The court held that 
even though the IRS had never disallowed the administrative claim, 
§ 2401(a) barred the suit because it was filed more than six years after 
the claim accrued.214  The taxpayer appealed.215  Before the case was 
briefed, however, the parties stipulated to voluntary dismissal of the 
appeal “[p]ursuant to [their] agreement to settle.”216  In apparently 
declining to defend the district court’s decision, the Government—
represented by the Appellate Section of the Tax Division of the 
Department of Justice217—missed a promising opportunity to correct 
the error of Detroit Trust and the IRS’s acquiescent guidance, at least 
within the Ninth Circuit.  Nevertheless, the district court’s decision 
enforcing the six-year limit on a tax refund claim remains a useful 
model for future courts confronted with this issue. 
Surprisingly, the district court did not cite Clintwood Elkhorn, but 
it did rely heavily on Clintwood Elkhorn’s most important precedent, 
United States v. A.S. Kreider Co., from which the Clintwood Elkhorn 
Court borrowed the “outside limit” language.218  In Kreider, the 
 
214 Wagenet v. United States, No. SACV 08-00142 AG (ANx), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
115547, at *4–6 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2009). 
215 Notice of Appeal, Wagenet, No. SACV 08-00142 AG (ANx) (Nov. 12, 2009), ECF 
No. 31. 
216 Stipulation for Dismissal, Wagenet v. United States, No. 09-56800 (9th Cir. Dec. 2, 
2010), ECF No. 24. 
217 See id. 
218 United States v. A.S. Kreider Co., 313 U.S. 443, 447 (1941) (“We think the quoted 
language was intended merely to place an outside limit on the period within which all suits 
might be initiated under § 24(20).  Clearly, nothing in that language precludes the 
application of a different and shorter period of limitation to an individual class of actions 
even though they are brought under § 24(20).”), quoted in United States v. Clintwood 
Elkhorn Mining Co., 553 U.S. 1, 9 (2008).  Kreider also contained dicta that seems, out of 
its context, to suggest that the tax-specific statute of limitations overrides the Tucker Act 
in tax refund suits: “Indeed, the limitation in § 1113(a) [the predecessor to § 6532(a)] has 
no meaning whatever unless the limitation in § 24(20) [the Tucker Act] is construed not to 
govern proceedings for the recovery of ‘internal-revenue tax alleged to have been 
erroneously or illegally assessed or collected.’”  313 U.S. at 447–48.  By itself, this 
sentence suggests that the Tucker Act’s limitation period never governs tax refund suits. In 
context, however, the sentence can only mean that the Tucker Act should not be construed 
as the exclusive statute of limitations in such proceedings.  This interpretation is indicated 
by the immediately preceding statement that “the specific provision [the I.R.C. statute of 
limitations] is entirely consistent with the general provision in § 24(20) [the six-year bar].”  
Id. at 447.  In Kreider, the question was whether a suit should be allowed that complied 
with the Tucker Act but did not comply with the I.R.C.’s statute of limitations.  In that 
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Court interpreted the six-year statute of limitations then in effect219 
and observed of its “no suit . . . shall be allowed . . . unless” 
formulation that by “[p]hrasing the condition negatively, Congress 
left it open to provide less liberally for particular actions which, 
because of special considerations, required different treatment.”220  
To the Kreider Court, the 1926 Revenue Act’s statute of limitations 
(barring suits filed more than five years after payment unless filed 
within two years of disallowance)221 was “precisely that type of 
provision.”222  The Court concluded that the tax-specific statute of 
limitations was “entirely consistent with the general provision”223 and 
that the taxpayer’s refund claim was barred by the less liberal, tax-
specific statute.224 
After interpreting the plain meaning of “every civil action” in 
§ 2401(a) to include tax refund suits,225 the district court in Wagenet 
followed the logic of Kreider, concluding that it lacked subject-matter 
jurisdiction over the taxpayer’s refund suit because it was filed more 
than six years after the claim accrued.226  In response to the 
taxpayer’s argument “that Section 6532(a)(1) is the exclusive time 
limit in cases where the government does not give notice of 
disallowance,”227 the court cited Ninth Circuit precedent 
characterizing § 2401(a) as “‘the catchall statute of limitations 
provision’ that ‘applies to all civil actions whether legal, equitable or 
mixed,’” and instructing that “the words ‘every civil action’ in 
Section 2401 ‘must be interpreted to mean what they say.’”228 
 
context, a statement that the Tucker Act should not be “construed to govern” does not 
imply that it should never be construed to bar tax refund claims.  Indeed, Kreider assumes 
that the Tucker Act’s six-year limit does govern as “an outside limit on the period within 
which all suits might be initiated under [the Tucker Act].”  Id. 
219 Judicial Code, ch. 231, § 24(20), 36 Stat. 1087, 1093 (1911) (codified at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 41(20)). 
220 Kreider, 313 U.S. at 447. 
221 Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 1113(a), 44 Stat. 9, 116  (reenacting without change 
R.S. § 3226, 43 Stat. 253, 343 (1924)) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 156). 
222 313 U.S. at 447. 
223 Id. 
224 Id. at 449. 
225 Wagenet v. United States, No. SACV 08-00142 AG (ANx), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
115547, at *5–7; see supra Part II.A. 
226 Id. at *7–8. 
227 Id. at *6. 
228 Id. at *7 (quoting Nesovic v. United States, 71 F.3d 776, 778 (9th Cir. 1995)).  
Nesovic applied the six-year limit of 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) to bar a quiet title action under 
28 U.S.C. § 2410(a). 
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The district court reinforced this conclusion with the observation 
that “[t]he statutory scheme allowing suits for tax refunds is a limited 
waiver of the federal government’s sovereign immunity, and ‘statutes 
in derogation of sovereignty are strictly construed in favor of the 
sovereign.’”229  The court noted the absurd result that flows from 
Detroit Trust. “If the holding in Detroit Trust were accepted, 
plaintiffs could sue the United States for a refund hundreds of years 
after accrual of their claims.”230  In light of the plain meaning of 
§ 2401(a), the Wagenet court concluded that “Congress obviously did 
not intend such a result.”231 
The Wagenet decision conceives of the relationship between the 
general and tax-specific statutes of limitations more coherently than 
Detroit Trust did, but it is not without its own interpretive flaws.  The 
Wagenet court held that the holding of Detroit Trust conflicts with the 
Supreme Court’s statement in Michel that “permission to sue for a tax 
refund ‘did not depend upon the rejection of the claim or upon the 
giving of the notice.’”232  This misreads Michel.  The quoted 
statement implied nothing about the effect of the Tucker Act’s six-
year limit.  It meant only that because the Commissioner did not act 
within “six months from the date of filing [the administrative] 
claim[s],”233 the default six-month waiting period between filing an 
administrative claim and filing a refund suit had not been waived.234  
Only with the Commissioner’s notice of an early disallowance could a 
taxpayer prove an early suit was timely.  This confusing statement in 
Michel was not directly relevant to the facts of that case, since the 
Michel appellants did not file suit before the expiration of the six-
month waiting period. 
The Wagenet court also misinterprets the Michel Court’s statement 
about another part of § 156.  The Supreme Court said of the notice 
requirement that “the clause reasonably may be read merely as a 
direction to the Commissioner to send the notice to claimant without 
making the failure so to do have the effect of enlarging the period for 
 
229 Id. (quoting Bruno v. United States, 547 F.2d 71, 74 (8th Cir. 1976)); see supra Part 
II.F. 
230 Id. at *8. 
231 Id. 
232 Id. (quoting United States v. Michel, 282 U.S. 656, 658–59 (1931) (“As the 
Commissioner did not act within six months, permission to sue did not depend upon the 
rejection of the claim or upon the giving of the notice.”). 
233 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 1014(a), R.S. § 3226, 43 Stat. 253, 343 (codified at 
26 U.S.C. § 156). 
234 See 26 U.S.C. § 156. 
GUSTAFSON 10/28/2011  10:32 AM 
2011] An “Outside Limit” for Refund Suits 237 
suing as otherwise definitely prescribed.”235  The Wagenet court 
apparently understood this to mean the tax-specific statute of 
limitations does not enlarge the six-year period prescribed by the 
Tucker Act.236  Although this conclusion is consistent with Michel, it 
is not a fair interpretation of the quoted statement.  The Supreme 
Court meant only that the clause in § 156 mandating notice of 
disallowance within ninety days did not imply that failure to give the 
required notice tolled the statute of limitations.  The tax-specific two-
year limit at issue in Michel was triggered by the act of 
disallowance,237 unlike the two-year limit in today’s § 6532, which is 
measured from “the date of mailing . . . of a notice of the 
disallowance.”238  The district court’s misreading of Michel does not 
detract from its correct interpretation of the six-year statute of 
limitations—an interpretation that is fully consistent with Michel.  
The primary basis for the Wagenet court’s rejection of Detroit Trust 
was that case’s conflict with Kreider and the plain meaning of 
§ 2401(a), not its perceived conflict with Michel. 
C.  Other Cases Applying the Six-Year Limit to Tax Refund Suits 
At least two other courts, citing the “outside limit” language in 
Kreider, have concluded that the general and tax-specific limitations 
should operate together in tax refund cases.  Each has cited § 2401(a) 
as an alternative basis for disallowing a claim that is also untimely 
under § 6532(a)(1).  The District of New Jersey observed in 
Finkelstein v. United States that “[t]he six year limitation period . . . is 
an outside limit consistent with, but secondary to, the two year 
limitation period governing a tax refund.”239  Because the taxpayer 
 
235 Michel, 282 U.S. at 660. 
236 Wagenet, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115547, at *8. 
237 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 1014(a), R.S. § 3226, 43 Stat. 253, 343 (codified at 
26 U.S.C. § 156), quoted in Michel, 282 U.S. at 658. 
238 26 U.S.C. § 6532(a)(1). 
239 943 F. Supp. 425, 432 (D.N.J. 1996); see id. (“If 26 U.S.C. § 6532 fails due to the 
lack of certified or registered mailing, 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) acts as a secondary limiting 
period barring this action. . . . [M]ore than six years has passed since accrual of the [tax 
refund] action and, therefore, the action is barred.”); see also Ancel v. United States, 398 
F.2d 456, 457 (7th Cir. 1968) (recounting without criticism a plaintiff’s characterization of 
timely filing under both statutes of limitations as “conditions precedent to the District 
Court’s entertainment of their [tax refund] suit”); Moses v. United States, 43 F.2d 653, 659 
(E.D.N.Y. 1930) (observing that “Revised Statutes, § 3226, as amended, is not inconsistent 
with the so-called ‘Tucker Act,’” and dismissing the taxpayers’ complaint because it was 
untimely under both the tax-specific limitation period and the Tucker Act’s “general 
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filed suit more than six years after her claim accrued, the court held 
that even though the notice of disallowance was defective, the 
“general statute of limitations period in 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) . . . acts 
as a secondary limitation period barring this [tax refund] action.”240 
Following Finkelstein, the Northern District of New York recently 
cited § 2401(a) as an “alternative reason” for disallowing the 
taxpayer’s refund claim in Breland v. United States.241 The 
Government had not argued for enforcement of the general, six-year 
limitation, but the court raised the alternative jurisdictional bar sua 
sponte.242 
A Court of Claims tax case, West Publishing Co. Employees’ 
Preferred Stock Ass’n v. United States, repeated the “outside limit” 
language of Kreider, apparently under the belief that 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2501 provides an additional limit on tax refund claims beyond the 
two-year limitation period, though it disallowed the suit on the basis 
of the tax-specific limitation period.243  That court said as much the 
next year in Bowman Transportation Co. v. United States, a 
government contract case: “[A]pparently the regular six-year period 
of limitations contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2501 (1976) [would apply] 
when no express disallowance of [a tax] refund claim is issued.”244 
The holdings of Wagenet, Finkelstein, and Breland, and the dicta in 
West Publishing and Bowman Transportation are at odds with the 
Detroit Trust precedent, but they follow directly from the interpretive 
principles adopted in Kreider and developed in Clintwood Elkhorn.  
Despite these gestures by a few lower courts to the six-year limitation 
as governing tax refund suits, the Federal Circuit has yet to abandon 
its Detroit Trust precedent,245 and the IRS holds to the rule that only 
 
provision as to limitation applicable to all suits, in the absence of the special statute”), 
aff’d, 61 F.2d 791 (2d Cir. 1932). 
240 943 F. Supp. at 432. 
241 No. 5:10-CV-0007, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104499, *22 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2011). 
242 See Motion to Dismiss, Breland v. United States, No. 5:10-CV-0007 (N.D.N.Y. May 
24, 2010), ECF No. 6. 
243 198 Ct. Cl. 668, 674 n.6 (1972) (“Since [Kreider] there has been no question but that 
the general six-year statute was intended only as an outside limit on the period within 
which all suits against the United States might be begun, and that ‘Congress left it open to 
provide less liberally for particular actions which, because of special considerations, 
required different treatment.’” (quoting United States v. A.S. Kreider Co., 313 U.S. 443, 
447 (1941))). 
244 597 F.2d 254, 257 (1979) (holding that the Tucker Act’s six-year statute of 
limitations controls rather than 49 U.S.C. § 304a, a three-year statute of limitations 
governing transportation charge disputes). 
245 See supra notes 61–62. 
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the tax-specific statute of limitations applies to bar untimely suits on 
tax refund claims.246 
V 
THE CASE FOR PROSPECTIVE ENFORCEMENT OF THE SIX-YEAR BAR 
IN TAX REFUND LITIGATION 
A.  Prospective Administrative Reform 
The “outside limit” refrain of Clintwood Elkhorn and the anti-tax-
exception tenor of Mayo give the IRS good cause to reevaluate its 
position now, despite the decades that have passed since Detroit 
Trust.  The Service need not wait for the courts to reject its 
misinterpretation of the general, six-year limitation as inapplicable to 
tax refund suits—and in fact, taxpayer expectations may be more 
upset if the courts impose the correction than if the agency 
orchestrates a change of position.  The IRS should revise Revenue 
Ruling 56-381 and other guidance indicating that § 6532(a)(1) is the 
only statute of limitations applicable to tax refund litigation.247  The 
IRS should also amend its standard notice of disallowance, which 
currently informs the claimant that she has two years from the date of 
mailing in which to file suit.  The revised notice should warn the 
taxpayer that she must file suit within two years of the date of mailing 
and within six and a half years after the date she filed her 
administrative claim.  The revised notice of disallowance could 
inform the claimant that if the latter date has passed, judicial review is 
foreclosed.  A comprehensive revision of the relevant IRS guidance 
would put taxpayers on notice that they have at most six and a half 
years after filing a tax refund claim in which to file suit in a federal 
district court or the Court of Federal Claims, even if they never 
receive a formal disallowance from the IRS. 
Due to the longstanding administrative and judicial authority 
misinterpreting 28 U.S.C. §§ 2401(a) and 2501 as inapplicable to the 
tax context, the Treasury Department would do well to give advance 
warning that it will seek to enforce the six-year bar in future tax 
refund suits.  Although the prevailing interpretation of the general 
statute of limitations violates its plain meaning and numerous canons 
of statutory construction,248 an unwitting taxpayer who has not 
 
246 See sources cited supra note 30. 
247 See id. 
248 See supra Part II. 
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received a notice from the IRS disallowing her administrative refund 
claim might delay filing suit in reliance on the Detroit Trust line of 
tax refund cases,249 on the IRS guidance acquiescing in those 
cases,250 and on the generally compliant conduct of the Department of 
Justice.251  Prospective notice that the Government intends to invoke 
the six-year bar against untimely tax refund suits would warn 
claimants who intend to sue for tax refunds that they may no longer 
wait indefinitely to do so when the IRS has not yet mailed a notice of 
disallowance. 
The problem with attempting a prospective-only revision of the 
administrative guidance on the application of §§ 2401(a) and 2501 to 
tax refund suits is that the IRS is not permitted to credit or refund an 
overpayment “after the expiration of the period of limitations for 
filing suit, unless within such period suit was begun by the 
taxpayer.”252  If the IRS accepts, as this Article urges, that “the period 
of limitations for filing suit” is governed by the general, six-year bar 
as well as the tax-specific, two-year limitation, then as a general rule 
the Service is statutorily obligated to deny the refund claim of a 
taxpayer who has failed to file suit within six years of accrual.  The 
IRS will therefore have no choice but to immediately enforce its 
corrected interpretation of 28 U.S.C. §§ 2401(a) and 2501. 
Fortunately, the IRS may be able to accomplish for many refund 
claimants a result similar to prospective notice by systematically 
granting extensions of the time in which to file suit.  This proposal 
assumes that I.R.C. § 6532(a)(2) countenances agreements to extend 
the period for filing suit beyond the six-year, post-accrual 
limitation.253  Although this proposition is not beyond dispute, it is a 
reasonable interpretation of § 6532(a)(2), and it presumes a much 
narrower implied amendment of 28 U.S.C. §§ 2401(a) and 2501 than 
Detroit Trust’s total nullification of the six-year bar in the tax context. 
The IRS may be able to grant extensions even to taxpayers whose 
claims are more than six years old.  Although it is the policy of the 
IRS not to grant extensions after the expiration of the two-year statute 
 
249 See sources cited supra notes 61 & 66; see generally Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. 
Ct. 876, 913 (2010) (“[R]eliance interests are important considerations in property and 
contract cases, where parties may have acted in conformance with existing legal rules in 
order to conduct transactions.” (citing Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991))). 
250 See sources cited supra note 30. 
251 See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
252 I.R.C. § 6514(a)(2). 
253 See supra Part III.C. 
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of limitations,254 the extension provision itself does not foreclose the 
possibility of reviving an otherwise expired limitation period.  It 
provides only that the two-year period “shall be extended for such 
period as may be agreed upon in writing” between the parties.255  The 
IRS interprets “extended” to mean “the continuation of an existing 
period of time with no intervening lapse,”256 but the word can be 
defined more broadly.257 
Paragraph 6532(a)(4) provides that “[a]ny consideration, 
reconsideration, or action by the Secretary with respect to such claim 
following the mailing of a notice by certified mail or registered mail 
of disallowance shall not operate to extend the period within which 
suit may be begun.”258  But that provision is aimed at unilateral 
“action[s] by the Secretary”—not joint agreements with the taxpayer.  
It is designed to avoid accidental renewal of the limitations period by 
some writing from the agency that the taxpayer construes as a new 
notice of disallowance.  Notably, the Revenue Ruling forbidding post-
expiration extension pursuant to § 6532(a)(2) does not mention 
paragraph (a)(4), which was in effect at the time.  In any event, the 
provision only operates “following the mailing of a notice . . . of 
disallowance”; by its own terms it has no application in the 
circumstance relevant here—when the IRS has issued no notice of 
disallowance. 
Comparison with a related statute suggests that Congress may have 
intended to allow the period for filing suit to be extended even after 
its expiration.  At the same time Congress enacted § 6532(a)(2) it 
 
254 See Rev. Rul. 71-57, 1971-1 C.B. 405 (“District Directors may not enter into 
agreements to extend the two-year period of limitations prescribed by section 6532(a)(1) 
of the Code for commencing a refund suit after such period has expired.”); IRM 
8.7.7.2.3(2) (Oct. 26, 2007), available at http://www.irs.gov/irm/part8/irm_08-007-007 
.html#d0e59; id. pt. 8.7.7.2.3(3); see also sources cited supra note 187. 
255 I.R.C. § 6532(a)(2). 
256 Rev. Rul. 71-57, 1971-1 C.B. 406 (citing State v. Scott, 20 S.W. 1076, 1077 (Mo. 
1893) (“The word ‘extended’ as employed in this [unrelated] statute means ‘prolonged;’ 
and of course a prolongation of time cannot occur after the time originally limited has 
expired.”); Schlosser Leather Co. v. Gillespie, 6 S.W. 2d 328, 328 (Tenn. 1928) (“To 
extend means to stretch out or to draw out or to enlarge a thing.  It implies some thing in 
existence. Extend is a transitive verb, requiring an object.  The object of the extension in 
the statute is the 45 days.  The 45 days have lapsed, there is nothing to extend; no period to 
prolong.”)). 
257 See OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE, “extend, v.” def. 6(b) (“To widen the 
range, scope, area of application of (a law, operation, dominion, state of things, etc.); to 
enlarge the scope or meaning of (a word).”), http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/66923 (last 
visited Sept. 20, 2011). 
258 I.R.C. § 6532(a)(4); see Treas. Reg. § 301.6532-1 (1967). 
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enacted another extension provision, I.R.C. § 6501(c)(4), for 
prolonging the three-year period within which the IRS must assess a 
tax.  That provision twice limits extensions to those agreed upon 
“before the expiration” of the period to be extended.259  These related, 
contemporaneous statutes should be read in pari materia,260 and the 
inclusion in § 6501(c)(4) of a prohibition on extension after expiration 
suggests that such a prohibition should not be implied in § 6532(a)(2) 
where it is absent.261  Following this line of argument, the Eighth 
Circuit has held that when the IRS agrees to an extension after the 
expiration of the two-year limitation period (in violation of its own 
Revenue Ruling), the extension is effective and the taxpayer may file 
suit within the period agreed upon.262 
Simultaneously with the publication of its corrected guidance, the 
IRS should announce its willingness to grant an extension of two 
years from the date of the announcement to any taxpayer who comes 
forward with evidence of an administrative claim for refund that the 
IRS has failed to disallow.  This would give attentive taxpayers with 
pending refund claims at least two years thereafter to file suit—a time 
limit equivalent to the two years they would have had under the 
prevailing single-limitation regime if the IRS were to disallow their 
claims on the announcement date.  A universal, one-time extension 
policy would be not just equitable but strategic as well, because courts 
may look with disfavor on an abrupt reversal of the Government’s 
acquiescence in Detroit Trust. 
B.  Prospective Judicial Enforcement 
Federal courts also have a role to play in an equitable transition 
from the Detroit Trust tax exception.  Understandably, few have 
addressed the application of § 2401(a) to tax refund suits, not least 
because both parties to a tax refund suit are usually disinclined to 
provide any helpful analysis on the subject.  Taxpayers will not raise 
the issue against their own interest, and the Government so far has 
 
259 See I.R.C. § 6501(c)(4)(A) (“Where, before the expiration of the time prescribed in 
this section for the assessment of any tax imposed by this title, . . . both the Secretary and 
the taxpayer have consented in writing to its assessment after such time, the tax may be 
assessed at any time prior to the expiration of the period agreed upon.  The period so 
agreed upon may be extended by subsequent agreements in writing made before the 
expiration of the period previously agreed upon.”). 
260 See supra Part II.D. 
261 See supra Part II.E. 
262 Kaffenberger v. United States, 314 F.3d 944, 952–53 (8th Cir. 2003). 
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declined to reverse its acquiescence in Detroit Trust.263  But federal 
courts “bear an independent obligation to assure [them]selves that 
jurisdiction is proper before proceeding to the merits.”264  Courts 
must therefore consider whether the six-year “outside limit” applies, 
even if the Government fails to invoke it.265 
A court confronting a tax refund claim filed more than six years 
after accrual may be able to announce the applicability of §§ 2401(a) 
and 2501 to such claims prospectively without throwing the taxpayer 
out of court on that basis.  Under Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, a court 
may announce a new rule of law prospectively, without applying it to 
the parties at bar and without retroactive effect on nonparties,266 
provided that no controlling case has already announced the rule.267  
This sort of purely prospective adjudication is available even when a 
jurisdictional rule is at stake.268  To decide whether nonretroactive 
adjudication is appropriate in a given case, courts consider three 
factors: 
First, the decision to be applied nonretroactively must establish a 
new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on 
which litigants may have relied, or by deciding an issue of first 
impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed.  
Second, . . . [the court] must . . . weigh the merits and demerits in 
each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its 
purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further 
or retard its operation. Finally, [the court] weigh[s] the inequity 
imposed by retroactive application. . . .269 
 
263 See supra notes 12 & 216. 
264 Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 324 
(2008). 
265 See John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 136 (2008) (holding 
28 U.S.C. § 2501 to be “jurisdictional and not susceptible to equitable tolling” (internal 
quotation marks and alterations omitted)); Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay Int’l Shipping 
Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 434 (2007) (“[O]nce a court determines that jurisdiction is lacking, it 
can proceed no further and must dismiss the case on that account.”). 
266 404 U.S. 97, 106–08 (1971). 
267 See Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993) (prohibiting 
prospective adjudication where a prior case has already applied the new legal principle to 
different parties). 
268 See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 88 (1982) 
(applying Chevron Oil to give only prospective effect to the Court’s holding that the 
bankruptcy courts were exercising unconstitutional jurisdiction under the Bankruptcy Act 
of 1978); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 142 (1976) (“[T]he [Federal Election] 
Commission’s inability to exercise certain powers because of the [unconstitutional] 
method by which its members have been selected should not affect the validity of the 
Commission's administrative actions and determinations to this date.”). 
269 Id. at 91 n.4 (quoting Chevron Oil, 404 U.S. at 106–07). 
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These factors counsel in favor of prospective application of the six-
year bar to tax refund suits.  First, in jurisdictions that have explicitly 
followed Detroit Trust, there is “clear past precedent” in which 
taxpayers have a strong reliance interest; in other jurisdictions, the 
IRS’s longstanding acquiescence in Detroit Trust270 means that a 
contrary holding has not been clearly foreshadowed for any but the 
most sophisticated taxpayers.  Arguably the second Chevron Oil 
factor weighs against nonretroactive adjudication.  The “purpose and 
effect” of the six-year bar, as with any statute of limitations, is to 
secure the repose of old claims and to prevent the costs associated 
with their litigation.  Allowing old claims to be litigated in spite of the 
plain language of §§ 2401(a) and 2501 subverts the intended purpose 
and effect of those provisions.  But Chevron Oil itself prospectively 
enforced a statute of limitations,271 so the six-year bar is not ineligible 
for prospective application to tax refund suits on that basis alone.  
Moreover, the costs of delaying enforcement of the statute of 
limitations are outweighed by the third Chevron Oil factor.  
Retroactive enforcement of the six-year bar in the tax context after 
decades of forbearance by the IRS and the courts would impose 
considerable inequities on taxpayers who delayed filing suit in 
reliance on the Detroit Trust rule. 
Short of Chevron Oil’s extreme remedy of prospective 
adjudication,272 courts can mitigate the detrimental effect of taxpayer 
 
270 See sources cited supra note 30. 
271 See 404 U.S. at 100 (holding that state statutes of limitations apply to suits for 
personal injuries occurring on artificial islands on the outer continental shelf, but declining 
to enforce Louisiana’s one-year statute of limitations in the suit at hand). 
272 Courts may be reluctant to apply Chevron Oil’s retroactivity analysis because dicta 
in Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation may be read to suggest nonretroactive 
adjudication is always inappropriate in civil cases, as it is in criminal cases.  The Court had 
previously held, in Griffith v. Kentucky, that “a new rule for the conduct of criminal 
prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct 
review or not yet final, with no exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a 
‘clear break’ with the past.”  479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987).  At one point, the Harper Court 
purported to apply this broad retroactivity rule to the civil context.  See 509 U.S. at 97 
(“This rule extends Griffith’s ban against ‘selective application of new rules.’”); see also 
id. at 104 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[A]fter Griffith, Chevron Oil can be adhered to only by 
rejecting the reasoning of Chevron Oil—that is, only by asserting that the issue of 
retroactivity is different in the civil and criminal settings.” (citations omitted)).  But this 
passage in the majority opinion is dicta.  See id. at 110 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  Harper 
holds only that nonretroactivity is inappropriate where a controlling case has already 
“applie[d] a rule of federal law to the parties before it.”  Id. at 97.  The opinion makes 
clear that a court announcing a new rule may decline to apply it retroactively.  See id. at 97 
(noting that the Court may “reserve the question whether its holding should be applied to 
the parties before it” (quoting James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529 
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reliance on Detroit Trust and its progeny by raising sua sponte the 
jurisdictional question of the six-year bar’s application to tax refund 
suits.  In so doing, courts will forewarn future claimants that they 
must file suit within six and a half years of filing an administrative 
claim, whether or not that rule bars the claim before the court.  
Especially in cases where the six-year bar is one of multiple grounds 
for dismissing the taxpayer’s suit, a court may prospectively undercut 
taxpayer reliance by explicitly rejecting Detroit Trust in an alternate 
holding.273  By emphasizing that untimely suits are barred by the 
general, post-accrual limitation—and not just the tax-specific, post-
disallowance limitation—courts will put future claimants on notice 
that the six-year bar applies to their claims no matter when, if ever, 
the IRS mails a notice of disallowance. 
CONCLUSION 
Applying the six-year bar of 28 U.S.C. §§ 2401(a) and 2501 as an 
“outside limit” on tax refund claims would restore the plain meaning 
of those provisions, promote timely resolution of tax refund claims, 
obviate adjudication of ancient informal claims, and standardize 
federal claims jurisprudence by bringing the requirements for tax 
refund claims into line with the time limits applicable to most other 
claims against the Government.  These values are well worth the costs 
of changing course more than fifty years after the Claims Court’s 
inauspicious decision in Detroit Trust.  By prospectively abrogating 
the Detroit Trust rule,274 the IRS and the courts can help to effect this 
doctrinal correction with minimal damage to taxpayers’ reliance 
interest in the old tax exception. 
The Supreme Court’s recent, unanimous decisions in United States 
v. Clintwood Elkhorn Mining Co.275 and Mayo Foundation for 
 
(1991))); see also Daniel R. Cahoy, Changing the Rules in the Middle of the Game: How 
the Prospective Application of Judicial Decisions Related to Intellectual Property Can 
Promote Economic Efficiency, 41 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 36 (2003) (noting that Harper does not 
foreclose the possibility of “a fully prospective decision”). 
273 See Breland v. United States, No. 5:10-CV-0007, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104499, 
*21-22 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2011) (holding the suit untimely under I.R.C. § 6532(a)(1), 
but also holding that “the Court . . . is deprived of subject-matter jurisdiction to hear 
Plaintiff’s claims” for the “alternative reason” that Plaintiff file her complaint more than 
six years after her claim accrued); Finkelstein v. United States, 943 F. Supp. 425, 432 
(D.N.J. 1996) (“[T]he general statute of limitations period in 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) . . . acts 
as a secondary limitation period barring this [tax refund] action.”). 
274 See sources cited supra note 30. 
275 553 U.S. 1 (2008). 
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Medical Education & Research v. United States276 make this an ideal 
time to reexamine the parallel statutes of limitations.  Enforcing the 
six-year bar in the tax context will give effect to Clintwood Elkhorn’s 
characterization of that statute as an “outside limit on the period 
within which all suits must be initiated”277 and will heed Mayo’s 
warning against “tax law only” exceptions to generally applicable 
rules.278 
 
 
276 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011). 
277 553 U.S. at 8 (quoting United States v. A.S. Kreider Co., 313 U.S. 443, 447 (1941)). 
278 131 S. Ct. at 713. 
